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British Impeachments (1376- 1787)
and the Preservation of the American
Constitutional Order
by FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III*
Introduction: Why British Impeachments Matter
Impeachment is a British invention, employed by Parliament beginning
in 1376 to resist the general tendency of the monarchy to absolutism and to
counter particularly obnoxious royal policies by removing the ministers who
implemented them. The invention crossed the Atlantic with the British
colonists who would one day rebel against their mother country and create
an independent United States of America.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates decided
that presidents and other federal officers could be impeached, but they
recoiled from the severe and occasionally fatal punishments imposed by
Parliament, and they wrestled over what conduct should be impeachable.
Early in their deliberations they resolved that the sole punishment for
impeachment would be removal from office and in some cases
disqualification from future office-holding. But defining the nature of
impeachable offenses proved more troublesome. Various formulations were
advanced. As the convention rounded into the home stretch, the phrase that
had taken hold was "treason or bribery."2 George Mason objected because
* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law at the University of Missouri
School of Law. I am immensely grateful for the work of my research assistants, Sam Crosby and
Taylor Payne, and for the indefatigable support of the good folks at the University of Missouri Law
Library, in particular its director Randy Diamond and librarian Cynthia Shearrer. Many of the ideas
discussed in this article first appeared in FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III, HIGH CRIMES &
MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP (2019). Longer extracts
reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
2. In July 1787, the delegates twice voted in favor of the general proposition that the
president should be removable for "malpractice or neglect of duty." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 61, 69, 116 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS,
VOL. 2]. Many delegates endorsed impeachment of presidents and other federal officials for a body
of offenses outside the common law crimes, using terms such as "maladministration," "corrupt
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he thought "treason or bribery" far too narrow. Mason was a student of
British impeachment and had authored the post-revolutionary impeachment
provisions of the Virginia state constitution.3  He wanted a federal
impeachment remedy analogous to British practice, at least in the conduct it
covered, even if not in the sorts of brutal punishments Parliament could
impose.4
"Treason," Mason said, "will not reach many great and dangerous
offences. Hastings is not guilty of treason."5  He was referring to the
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of India, just
about to start in England.6 Mason wanted American impeachments to reach
beyond the two indictable crimes of treason and bribery to important
breaches of public trust in both the domestic and foreign sphere, the kinds of
offenses charged against Hastings, and as we will see, against many other
British officials over the preceding four centuries.
Mason's solution was to add the word "maladministration" after
"bribery." But James Madison rose to object, saying, "[s]o vague a term will
be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.",7 Mason thought the
matter over and came back with a compromise. Omit "maladministration"
but add to treason and bribery "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 8 The
new language passed eight states to three.
9
Mason's choice of "high crimes and misdemeanors" was not whimsical.
Rather, he lifted it from centuries of British practice in which Parliament
increasingly (though not invariably) used this phrase to describe conduct it
charged as impeachable. As a result, one of the perennial arguments in
American impeachments is over whether the Framers intended "high crimes
administration," "neglect of duty," and "misconduct in office." Id. at 64-69. On August 20, 1787,
the Committee on Detail reported to the convention that federal officers "shall be liable to
impeachment and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption." Id. at 337.
In its report of September 4, 1787, the Committee of Eleven proposed that the President be
removable only on conviction of "treason or bribery." Id. at 495.
3. PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at
65-66 (1984).
4. Though not the focus of this Article, it is fair to say that the indispensable innovation of
America's adaptation of impeachment to the sphere of representative democracy was not in the
definition of impeachable conduct, but in the limitation of the consequence of impeachment to
removal from office.
5. FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550.
6. See infra, notes 200404, and accompanying text.
7. FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550.
8. Id. Mason's original formulation was "other high crimes and misdemeanors against the
State." Id. The phrase "against the State" was later amended to "against the United States," id. at
551, and then deleted altogether by the Committee on Style in the final draft of the Constitution.
9. Id.
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and misdemeanors" as a term of art limiting impeachable conduct to only
those misdeeds impeached by Parliament prior to 1787.10
My study of both British and American impeachments convinces me
that "high crimes and misdemeanors" do not limit the Congressional
impeachment power to the particular, and with the passing years increasingly
antique, list of transgressions Parliament had addressed by 1787.11 Both
Parliament and the Framers were acutely conscious that the sorts of
dangerous public misconduct for which impeachment is a necessary remedy
could not easily be described in advance. Therefore, even as an original
matter, the adoption of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" invites
an elastic application of the impeachment remedy tailored to the needs and
circumstances of the political era in which it is invoked. The appeal of a
more expansive reading is even greater if one leans toward the "living
constitution" view of our founding charter. However, the argument of this
Article does not depend on resolving either the debate over originalism as an
interpretive method or the question of whether the Framers intended "high
crimes and misdemeanors" to be a narrowly restrictive term of art. Because
even if one takes the most restrictive view of the phrase, one that absolutely
prohibits to Americans impeachment for any sort of conduct not addressed
by British parliamentary precedents, the Framers' choice of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" nonetheless sets a baseline minimum for the scope of
American impeachments. In other words, even if one accepts both a strict
originalist approach to American constitutional interpretation and that the
Framers meant to confine American impeachment within the boundaries set
10. For example, Raoul Berger famously argued that the phrase was a "technical term"
derived from British practice, with which the Framers would have been familiar, and therefore that
its technical meaning "furnishes the boundary of the [impeachment] power." RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 71, 86-87 (1973). See also, HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 3, at 266-70 (arguing that the American understanding of impeachable offenses
essentially incorporates the British understanding). I think that British impeachment precedents
are central to understanding the Framers' ideas about impeachment-hence, this article-but I have
also long thought that one can overstate the case. Frank 0. Bowman, III, "High Crimes and
Misdemeanors ": Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1517, 1525 (1999). As this Article demonstrates, the British did not always use the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" to define impeachable offenses, and as scholars since Berger have
amply demonstrated, see HOFFER & HULL, supra note 3, at 1-106, by 1787, Americans had
developed a body of colonial and state impeachment precedent derivative of, but not identical to,
British practice. As noted in the text, I think it is right to say that British impeachment precedents
create a baseline minimum for the reach of the term "high crimes and misdemeanors." The
argument about how much further the term may properly reach is one for another day and need not
be resolved for the purposes of this Article.
11. This argument is developed at length in my forthcoming book, FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III,
HIGH CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP
(forthcoming 2019).
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by British practice, that means American officials are properly impeachable
for at least the range of conduct covered by British practice.
Therefore, at a moment when impeachment talk is rampant, a
reexamination of British impeachments up to 1787 is in order. The subject
is hardly novel. Every political generation confronted with a major
impeachment crisis has trawled parliamentary records for guidance or grist
for partisan argument. But comprehensive examinations of the whole sweep
of British impeachment practice are rare. 12 And almost all treatments of the
subject tend, understandably, to focus on the issues and types of conduct
peculiar to the contemporary controversy that moved their composition.
This Article examines the entire arc of British impeachments from 1376 to
1787, with particular attention to issues raised by the current presidency.
The Article concludes that, although British impeachment employed
many of the forms of a criminal trial and could produce dire personal
punishments of the sort we associate with criminal law, it was, first, last, and
always, a political tool in the larger sense. Parliament invented and
periodically resorted to impeachment as a means of resisting particular
objectionable policies of the crown or its ministers, but even more
fundamentally as a mechanism for bending the kingdom's basic
constitutional order away from absolutism and toward representative
government. This is a critical point. The most recent American
impeachment battle, the tawdry inquiry into Bill Clinton's extramarital
sexual dalliances and his desperate efforts to hide them, finally turned on the
question of whether such low and degraded matters amounted to "high
crimes." It transformed the most august tribunal of American democracy
into a sort of constitutional police court, obsessed with oral sex, the meaning
of "is," and the technicalities of perjury statutes. 13 One effect of the Clinton
debacle was to condition the current generation of citizens and scholars to
discuss impeachment in terms of the minutiae of whether some presidential
action offends the letter of this or that statute. 14 A study of the long run of
12. The last reasonably comprehensive American treatment of the subject was in Raoul's
1973 classic, BERGER, supra note 10, at 7-78, but Berger spends an inordinate amount of time
addressing the question of what he calls "retrospective treasons," to the detriment of consideration
of other issues that I confess to thinking more germane to present circumstances. Perhaps the most
comprehensive, if dated, American treatment is ALEXANDER SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 150-51 (1916). See also, H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13-29 (2010) (touching some important high
points of British impeachment history).
13. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, Falling Out of Love With America: The Clinton
Impeachment and the Madisonian Constitution, 59 MD. L. REv. 5 (2001).
14. See, e.g., the debate over whether the June 16, 2016, Trump Tower meeting between
Donald Trump, Jr. and other figures in the Trump presidential campaign and some Russian persons
may have constituted a violation of federal election laws, summarized in Frank 0. Bowman, III,
The Russian Lawyer Meetings and Election Law Crimes: The Experts Weigh In, IMPEACHABLE
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British impeachments reminds us that, like any other legal mechanism,
impeachment will sometimes be employed for petty or ignoble purposes, but
it was invented as a mighty weapon against executive tyranny and a powerful
tool for preservation of the constitution. Thus, the "high" transgressions that
should most readily provoke impeachment may not be indictable crimes, or
even discrete incidents of technical misconduct, but policies or patterns of
behavior destructive of the constitutional order.
That said, the legalistic form of impeachment-the specification of
offenses by the lower legislative house in articles of impeachment followed
by a trial of those offenses in the upper house-mandates an inquiry into the
particular types or categories of misbehavior that Great Britain's Parliament
found impeachable. Even when Parliament expressly alleged that the
behavior of the accused endangered the constitution, the Commons laid out
the particulars and the Lords put them to their proof. Thus, over the
centuries, Parliament developed a body of precedent that roughly defined
and loosely cabined its impeachment power. To the extent that the Framers
incorporated British precedent into their model of American impeachment,
knowing what Parliament embraced as impeachable conduct helps us set the
parameters for impeachment under the United States Constitution.
In sum, Parliament found the following categories of conduct
impeachable: (1) treason, particularly of the crude sort that involved armed
rebellion, plotting against the monarch's life, or aiding avowed foreign
enemies in war, but also including a good deal of much more subtly
subversive behavior (arguments over the proper reach of treason consumed
much parliamentary energy); (2) ordinary criminality, such as false
imprisonment, rape, or murder; (3) corruption, which might consist of
indictable behavior like outright bribery or extortion, but just as often
involved misuses of office for private gain that were not strictly criminal, but
were nonetheless understood to drain the public purse or subvert public
confidence in government to an intolerable degree; (4) incompetence,
neglect of duty, or maladministration in office; (5) betrayal of the nation's
foreign policy interests, sometimes characterized as treason, but always
based on a determination that a minister had engaged in behavior (with or
without the monarch's sanction) directly at odds with Parliament's view of
the nation's fundamental interests; and (6) as noted, subversion of the
constitution and laws of the realm.
OFFENSES? BLOG (July 13, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/13/the-russian-lawyer-
meeting-and-election-law-crimes-the-experts-weigh-in/.
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I. The Origins of Impeachment
Ever since human beings first formed hierarchical societies they have
wrestled with the problem of how to displace powerful people who
misbehave. In absolute monarchies (or personal dictatorships), the solution
is simple. An absolute ruler's subordinates remain in office at his pleasure
and are removed, and perhaps punished, when he is sufficiently displeased.
The monarch himself can only be displaced by palace coup, national
revolution, or external invasion, with all the bloodshed and general
inconvenience those remedies imply.
The problem becomes more complicated once political and economic
power is dispersed among competing centers of authority. A monarch whose
continued reign depends in some measure on the support of powerful
hereditary nobles can no longer be quite so arbitrary in his treatment of those
who hold positions of authority under him, many of whom will be those
nobles or members of their families. As a result, the nobility gains a voice
in the selection and removal of officials who may please the ruler but
displease the nobility. The more centers of power develop external to the
monarchy-land-holding lesser gentry, clergy, merchants, bankers,
professional lawyers and judges-the more complicated the problem of
removal of the powerful becomes. The challenge lies not merely in
determining who will have authority to remove an official, but also in the
questions of whether removal should be accompanied by additional
punishment and what process should be employed in judging each case.
Great Britain began contending with these challenges very early in its
history. Magna Carta, now hailed as the Great Charter of English liberties,
was actually a peace treaty between King John and his rebellious barons
signed in 1215.15 Most of it dealt with issues of no modern relevance, such
as special kinds of rents and taxes called scutage and socage and placement
of fish weirs in the River Thames. 16 But several clauses addressed the issue
of removal and punishment of officials and persons of rank. The barons
wanted protection from royal arbitrariness. Accordingly, multiple
provisions of Magna Carta protect the nobility and "free men" 17 generally
15. JAMES C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 13-14 (3d ed. 2015).
16. Ild. See also WILLNLVM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 343-44 (2d ed. 1914).
17. The class of "free men" was smaller than might be supposed because it excluded those
bound to service, the unfree peasantry or "villeins." THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 507-08 (4th ed. 1948) [hereinafter PLUCKNETT, CONCISE
HISTORY]; T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD'S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
177-83 (1960) [hereinafter PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD].
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from punishment, including fines18 and loss of lands or status, except by "the
lawful judgment of his equals." 19 But the barons also wanted to get rid of
some of King John's retainers, so the king agreed in Magna Carta itself to
turn out of office all the kinsmen and followers of a fellow named Gerard de
Athde. 20 This result was no doubt pleasing to enemies of de Athde, but the
episode was entirely unsatisfactory as a model for how to deal with
troublesome royal officials. A system that requires strapping on your
chainmail and rallying the rest of the barons for a rebellion anytime you
disapprove of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Keeper of the Privy
Seal is tiresome in the last degree.
In the centuries following Magna Carta, the national governing body
we know as Parliament evolved in fits and starts from ad hoc assemblies of
notables such as Simon de Montfort's parliament of 126521 into a bicameral
legislature consisting of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.
From the earliest times, the relations between Parliament and the crown were
marked by two persistent and cross-cutting themes. On the one hand, the
great subjects of the realm were determined to influence the selection, and
removal, of royal ministers.22 On the other hand, those same great subjects
sought to ensure that, should they take office under the crown, something
akin to due process stood between themselves and removal, ruin, and
possibly death, whether at the whim of a capricious monarch or at the hands
of the crown's adversaries.2 3
For a good many years, the king could convict and sentence traitors and
other malefactors "by record," meaning that he simply recounted what he
believed to be the prisoner's misdeeds and a quasi-judicial body of noblemen
or common law judges, or perhaps the king himself, would then pronounce
judgment based on what the king had said. 24 But in time it came to be
accepted that all criminal proceedings, including those against officials,
18. Magna Carta, clause 21, provides that "[e]arls and barons shall be fined only by their
equals, and in proportion to the gravity of their offence." English translation of Magna Carta,
BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation.
19. Id. at cls. 39, 52.
20. English translation of Magna Carta, supra note 18, at cls. 50. For a discussion of why
the barons so disliked Athee, see MARGARET CAROLINE RICKABY, GIRARD D'ATHEE AND THE
MEN FROM THE TOURAINE: THEIR ROLES UNDER KING JOHN (2011), http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/901/.
21. ST. Ambler, Magna Carta: Its Confirmation at Simon de Montfort's Parliament of 1265,
130 ENG. HISTORICAL REV. 801 (2015).
22. D.A. CARPENTER, THE MINORITY OF HENRY III 407-12 (1990) (discussing the
determination of upper nobility to influence the choice of royal ministers).
23. T.F.T. Plucknett, The Origin of Impeachment, 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
HISTORICAL SOC'Y 47, 48 (1942) [hereinafter Plucknett, Origin].
24. Id. at 56-58.
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should be initiated in legal form and tried by a juridical body separate from
the crown. In cases involving persons of rank, the mandate of Magna Carta
that judgment should be imposed only by a body of one's equals meshed
with the natural inclinations of the notables who made up Parliament to
confer jurisdiction in such matters on Parliament itself.25 This innovation
ensured that the king could not easily strike against high-placed enemies
without the assent (however coerced or grudging) of Parliament. In due
course, it also evolved into a weapon Parliament could employ against royal
officers or policies of which it disapproved.
One might wonder how parliamentary pursuit of the king's men would
be thought an effective means of altering the king's policy. The short answer
lies in the modern catchphrase, "Personnel is policy," which recognizes that
implementation even of clear directives from an energetic ruler will fail
absent loyal, forceful, competent subordinates. But an absolute and
hereditary monarchy presents particular problems for the would-be reformer
because neither the monarch nor his subordinates are subject to
institutionalized limitation or control. In the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, Parliament gained increased formal authority over lawmaking and
the monarch's sources of revenue.26  Nonetheless, a king resolutely
determined to pursue his own courses despite parliamentary opposition had
considerable power to do so and, the monarchy being hereditary, he could
not be removed absent a genuine revolution. Therefore, parliaments
displeased by a king's policies, but unwilling to go so far as open rebellion,
indulged the fiction that the king was not at fault, but was being misled by
incompetent or malicious royal ministers.27 Parliament found it could hobble
unpopular royal policies by removing the minister charged with carrying
them out without disrupting the continuity of royal rule. If the most effective
executants of a king's policy are removed from the political board, the king's
policy will be crippled. If the king's ministers know that pursuit of the king's
policies in defiance of the will of Parliament presents a real risk of removal
from office and additional painful punishments, their enthusiasm for
implementing the king's will is likely to be sensibly diminished.
Another constant thread in the long debate over parliamentary
condemnation of erring officials was concern over retrospective
25. T.F.T. Plucknett, State Trials Under Richard //, 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
HISTORICAL SOC'Y 159, 159 (1952) (noting that by the reign of Richard 11 (1377-1399), "[t]he
principle had ... been accepted that parliament was the proper jurisdiction for the trial of eminent
or official persons who were accused of misconducting public affairs").
26. See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 184-93.
27. For a relatively modern expression of this sentiment, see the speech of the Duke of Argyl
during the debate in the House of Lords on the motion of Lord Carteret for the removal of Sir
Robert Walpole, 11 T.C. HANSARD, THE PARLLAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1098-101
(1812).
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punishments. Insofar as Parliament merely acted as the forum in which
nobles or servants of the crown were charged and tried for conduct that had
previously been defined by statute or common law as illegal, the process
presented no conceptual novelty. The principal matters requiring resolution
were the roles to be performed by each house, the degree and forms of due
process to be afforded the defendants, and the appropriate remedies in the
event of conviction. Most of these questions could be resolved by analogy
to legal procedures already employed in regular courts. But cases of the
great and powerful presented a special problem arising from two interlocking
features.
First, the misconduct alleged in these cases did not always violate a pre-
existing law. For example, in 1388, Michael De la Pole, the Earl of Suffolk,
and others were charged with "high treason" for, in effect, taking advantage
of their privileged access to young King Richard II to persuade the king to
adopt bad policies and to confer a variety of titles and favors on themselves. 28
Allegations of this sort had never previously been denominated treason.29
Nonetheless, in a monarchy, the behavior charged against Suffolk-the
king's favorites distorting national policy and grabbing wealth and power-
is precisely the kind of thing vigilant parliamentarians will be alert to
prevent. So it is not surprising that Parliament chose to treat it as treason in
Suffolk's case. Moreover, because it will often be difficult to predict, still
less to define in advance, the sorts of misbehavior, incompetence, or outright
knavery that should properly produce scrutiny and perhaps removal of
government officials, there was a natural disposition to keep the scope of
chargeable conduct indeterminate.
Second, for centuries, the possible penalties for losing a state trial were
not limited to removal from office, but included crippling fines, forfeiture of
lands and titles, imprisonment, and death (sometimes preceded by the
prolonged agony of being hanged, drawn, and quartered).30 In short, these
were criminal cases, at least in the sense that the punishments were of the
sort otherwise reserved for the most serious criminal offenses. During the
28. T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR
1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS VOL. 1 91-112 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL.
I]. Suffolk was first impeached in 1386 by the House of Commons and convicted by the House of
Lords on a set of charges not apparently denominated as treason. Id. at 90-91. The impeachment
removed Suffolk from office. Id. Later, in 1388, a set of "appeals" (in essence, criminal charges)
alleging treason were filed by certain lords in the House of Lords. Suffolk was convicted, but by
that time had prudently decamped to France. Id. at 97-98.
29. BERGER, supra note 10, at 2.
30. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 194-95, 418-19, 675 (describing
varieties of forfeitures as punishment for treason and in cases of attainder). The penalty of drawing
and quartering for treason was only abolished by the Forfeiture Act of 1870. A.B. KEITH, RIDGES'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ENGLAND 412 (6th ed. 1937).
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medieval and early Renaissance periods, the severity (and occasional
finality) of punishments imposed upon those convicted in state trials was
scarcely surprising. The losers of political struggles in those eras rarely
retired to the country to write their memoirs, but were distressingly apt to
respond by arranging a coup, assassination, or insurrection. 31 Accordingly,
simple prudence on the part of the winners of these contests dictated that
those convicted of state crimes should be disabled from creating future
mischief through imprisonment, exile, impoverishment, or death.
Nonetheless, a central principle of the evolving British common law of
crimes, expressed in the Latin phrase nulla poena sine lege, was that people
should not be punished except for violation of pre-existing law.32 Therefore,
British impeachment was always plagued by tension between the suspect
legitimacy of retrospective punishment and that pragmatic realization that
misconduct by public officials may subvert the proper functioning of
government and represent a danger to the state without being criminal or
indeed violating any existing law. So long as parliamentary trials produced
not only purges from office, but severe personal punishment, the process
bore a taint of fundamental unfairness.
II. The First British Impeachments
The term "impeachment" as a description of one mode of conducting a
state trial in Parliament made its appearance in the 1300s. Scholars of the
period speak of proceedings against notables accused of public misconduct
being initiated using various procedural vehicles: indictment, appeal of
felony, original writ, or even public clamor expressed in the House of
Commons. It seems to be broadly agreed that the first true "impeachments"
occurred in 1376, during the reign of Edward III in what was known as "the
Good Parliament.,
34
31. See generally J.M. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE, 106-238 (1996).
32. Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it
was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law: he had
therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of
consequence be cruel and unjust. All laws should be therefore made to commence
in futuro, and be notified before their commencement.
1 WILLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOK 46 (15th
ed. 1809).
33. T.F.T. Plucknett, The Impeachments of 1376, 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
HISTORICAL SOC'Y 153, 154 (1951) [hereinafter Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376]; 1 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 378 (3d ed. 1931) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, VOL. I].
34. Id. at 380; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 164; Plucknett, Origin,
supra note 23, at 69; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND, VOL. 1, 148-49 (1883); KEITH, supra note 30, at 215.
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These first impeachments set the paradigm for later parliamentary
actions against unpopular ministers. At the end of Edward's fifty-year reign,
when both the old King and his eldest son, Edward, known as the Black
Prince, were ailing, critics of some of the King's favorites moved against
them. The opposition's targets included the royal chamberlain, Lord
Latimer, the Steward of the Household, Lord Neville, as well as Richard
Lyons, William Ellis, and John Peake.3 5 The charges brought against them,
to which we will return momentarily, were various, but the distinctive feature
of the process is that each case was initiated by a formal accusation by the
House of Commons followed by a trial in the House of Lords.3 6
Even though these "impeachments" were directed at men who had long
enjoyed the favor of the King, the notables in opposition were at pains to
avoid the appearance of defying or undermining the authority of the crown.
During the impeachments of Lord Latimer and Richard Lyons, the Commons
specifically sought and obtained the sick King's approval to proceed in the
first instance and at several points thereafter.37 And the charges were
carefully framed to avoid casting blame on the crown, alleging instead that
the defendants had in effect deceived the king and misused his delegated
authority. Among the charges against Latimer was that he had "notoriously
accroached royal power. '38  Likewise, parliament did not proceed to
judgment until receiving assurance that the king was effectively abandoning
his former courtiers. Lyons was condemned only after several of the lords
testified that the king had disavowed Lyons' claim to have been acting on
the authority of the king and his council.39
There are two other points of interest for us in these first ancestral
impeachments. First, as is true down to the present day in American practice,
the lower house not only framed the charges for the upper house, but acted
as prosecutors or "managers" in presenting the case for trial.40 Second, while
a good many of the charges against those impeached in 1376 involved
corruption of varieties that might have been contrary to some preexisting
law, some of the allegations charged no apparent crime. For example, Lord
Latimer was impeached in part for his failure as a military leader to hold the
English-occupied French towns of Bdcherel and St. Saveur.4 1
35. STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 149.
36. See generally Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376, supra note 33.
37. Id. at 156-57, 162.
38. ld. at 160.
39. ld. at 163.
40. ld. at 164.
41. Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376, supra note 33, at 158.
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After Edward III died, he was succeeded in 1377 by his grandson,
Richard II, then only ten years old.42 In the early years of his reign, there
were ongoing disputes between the favorites and ministers of the young king
and an opposition party well-represented in Parliament.43 The details are
unimportant here. The key developments were that the lords and notables in
Parliament used the instrument of impeachment to remove several of
Richard's advisors, but when Richard gained political strength thereafter, he
attempted to seize royal control over the impeachment mechanism.
In 1386, the Commons brought charges in the form of impeachment
against Richard's Chancellor, Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk.44 Three
of the charges alleged garden variety corruption-purchasing crown
property at a discount or appropriating to himself revenues that ought to have
gone to the crown 45 -but several alleged simple incompetence or
misconduct in office. Article 3 charged that Suffolk had failed to use
parliamentary appropriations for maritime defense to good effect, and
Article 7 alleged that Suffolk had bungled the military expedition to relieve
Ghent.46 The Lords convicted Suffolk on some of the charges and, after great
pressure was placed on the King, Suffolk was removed from office and
imprisoned pending payment of a fine or ransom.
47
Not content with the impeachment and removal of Suffolk, the
opposition magnates forced Richard to accept a "commission of reform"
consisting of fourteen nobles with wide powers to set government policy.4 8
Unsurprisingly, Richard acceded only grudgingly and began working to
reverse these encroachments on his authority. Among his moves in this
direction was a formal set of inquiries directed to the judges of England in
1387, in one of which he asked whether, as a matter of law, his ministers
could be impeached without his consent. The judges, perhaps under
considerable royal pressure, said Parliament had no such power.49
42. NIGEL SAUL, RICHARDII 12, 24 (1997).
43. SIMON SCHAMA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN: AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD? 3500 B.C. 1603
A.D. 244-45 (2000); WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING
PEOPLES: THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 372-81 (1956).
44. HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 90-94.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 94; N.B. Lewis, Article VII of the Impeachment of Michael de la Pole in 1386, 42
ENG. HISTORICAL REv. 402,402 (1927).
47. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 170-71.
48. CHURCHILL, supra note 43, at 379.
49. Id. at 171-72; see also Stanley B. Chrimes, Richard H's Questions to the Judges, 1387,
72 L. Q. R. 365, 370 (1956); T.F.T. Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, 3 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOC'Y 145, 145 (1953) [hereinafter Plucknett, Impeachments and
Attainder].
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The Lords struck back in 1388 by bringing charges of treason against
Suffolk and other supporters of the King using the mechanism of the
"appeal. '50  An appeal differed from impeachment in that it was a
conventional means of bringing a criminal charge in which an aggrieved
party formally accused the wrongdoer and became in effect a private
prosecutor. 5 1 In Suffolk's case, five lords, known to British history as "the
Lords appellant," made their charges of treason directly in the House of
Lords, with no participation by the Commons.52 Not only did the House of
Lords convict Suffolk and his allies, but it then proceeded to impeach and
banish the judges who had previously declared that Parliament lacked the
power to impeach without the king's assent.53 In due course, however, the
King slowly regained power relative to dissident members of the nobility. In
1397-1398, Richard and his political allies used a combination of appeals
and impeachments to charge various of his opponents with treason and other
offenses. 4 Several were executed, murdered, or died in prison; others were
banished.55 In the course of these proceedings, Richard was careful to
reclaim the right of royal assent to impeachment proceedings.56 However,
his reassertion of authority did not last long. He was deposed by Henry
Bolingbroke in 1399 and died in captivity in early 1400. 57
There were no impeachments in the half-century following the death of
Richard 11. 58 However, in 1450, William de la Pole, grandson of the Michael
de la Pole impeached in 1386 and also bearing the title Earl of Suffolk, was
impeached by the House of Commons for various supposed offenses
connected to his negotiation of King Henry VI's marriage to the French
noblewoman, Margaret of Anjou. 59 Before Suffolk could be tried in the
House of Lords, Henry sought to save him from serious punishment by
50. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 172-73; Matthew Steilen, Bills of
Attainder, 53 HouS. L. REv. 767, 777 (2016).
51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 309 (1769).
52. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 172-73.
53. Id. at 173; Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, supra note 49, at 146-47.
54. The Dukes of Gloucester and the Earls of Warwick and Arundel were charged by appeal.
Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, supra note 49, at 149. Sir Thomas Mortimer and Sir John
Cobham were impeached. Id. at 151-52. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at
175-76. See HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 33, at 125.
55. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 175-76.
56. Plucknett, Impeachment and Attainder, supra note 49, at 153.
57. Anthony Tuck, Richard 11 (1367-1400), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT'L BIOGRAPHY
(2009), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10. 1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780
198614128-e-23499.
58. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 194.
59. Id. at 194; HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 272-73.
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banishing him on his own authority.60 The king's evasive maneuver did
Suffolk no good because the ship taking him into exile was captured in the
English Channel by brigands, who beheaded him on the side of a longboat.
The important point for us in Suffolk's downfall is that it represented a
resurrection of Parliament' s claim of power to impeach ministers against the
wishes of the crown.
Parliament may have reasserted its theoretical power to remove
troublesome ministers, but the power then lay dormant in practice for a
century and a half until the reign of James I in the first quarter of the
seventeenth century. Historians provide various explanations for the
interruption, but the basic one seems to have been the weakness of
Parliament relative to the crown during this period.62 Parliament was active
in the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547), but primarily as an instrument of the
king's will on projects like the reformation of the English church.6 3 During
Elizabeth I's forty-five year reign (1558-1603), she called parliaments about
every five years, but the body was only in session for a total of three years
while she was on the throne. 64 Throughout the Tudor period, ministers, high
clergy, noblemen, and others were cast out of office and some severely
punished or even executed, but these falls from grace were driven primarily
by the wishes of the monarch.65 In any case, as a procedural matter, the
crown chose not to reassert control over the impeachment mechanism, but to
employ other vehicles for condemning its enemies and erring servants, most
notably for our purposes the bill of attainder.
III. Bills of Attainder
A brief explanation of bills of attainder is in order here. Bills of
attainder differed from impeachments in several key respects. An
impeachment has the form of a judicial proceeding. Formal charges are
composed and approved by the lower legislative house and its
representatives act as prosecutors before the upper house, presenting
evidence in support of the charges. The upper house then acts as judges
passing on the question of whether the charges have been proven.6 6 By
contrast, a bill of attainder is a legislative act, meaning that the subject of the
60. HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 274-76.
61. Id. at275-76.
62. See, e.g., STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 158.
63. MAURICE ASHLEY, CHARLES I AND OLIVER CROMWELL: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS AND
COMPARISONS 141 (1987).
64. Id. at 141-42.
65. See generally J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII (1968); DIARMAID MACCULLOCH,
THOMAS CRANMER (1996); ELIZABETH JENKINS, ELIZABETH THE GREAT (1958).
66. BERGER, supra note 10, at 57; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at 256-57.
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bill can be condemned without any violation of law, or even clearly
articulable wrong, having been charged or proven.67 The bill passes through
Parliament like any other, with no necessary provision for those accused to
defend themselves.6 8 Punishments could be severe, including execution,
imprisonment, exile, ruinous fines, and forfeiture of lands and titles. 69 Bills
of attainder were often associated with "corruption of blood," which not only
stripped the offender of his property and titles, but barred his heirs from
inheriting. 0
During the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487),71 the warring Yorkist and
Lancastrian factions used bills of attainder rather than impeachments or
appeals to oust and eliminate their opponents.7 2 The heyday of attainders
arrived in the reign of Henry VIII, during which 130 regime opponents were
attainted and thirty-four executed. 3 Notable victims included Thomas
Cromwell 7 4 and the king's fifth wife, Catharine Howard.7 5 Notoriously,
Henry secured from the judges of England a declaration that, although it
would be bad form, an accused could be attainted by Parliament and
executed without any opportunity to be heard in his own defense. 6 It was
also common to pass bills of attainder posthumously to provide legal
justification for seizures or forfeitures of property or disinheritance of heirs.7 7
Bills of attainder were a very rough business. Not only did they produce
draconian punishments that could extend beyond the lifetime of the offender,
67. KEITH, supra note 30, at 216 ("Attainder served as a means of proceeding against a person
when no real charge could be substantiated."); PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17,
at 232-34. But see BERGER, supra note 10, at 29 (asserting that an attainder "is only by courtesy
labelled 'legislative,' for it is a judgment of individual guilt in everything but name"); see generally
Steilen, supra note 50 (arguing that bills of attainder should be considered forms of summary legal
process, rather than legislative acts).
68. Steilen, supra note 50, at 793.
69. J.R. Lander, L Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453-1509 4 HISTORICAL J. 119, 119 (2009),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/Journals/historical-journal/article/i-attainder-and-forfeiture-
1453-to-15091/1EA8DOEFB954878797B941400045B969.
70. Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty: History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19
N.Y.U. L. Q. 229, 233 (1942).
71. See generally DAVID GRUMMITT, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WARS OF THE ROSES
(2013).
72. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. 1, supra note 33, at 381; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra
note 17, at 233; KEITH, supra note 30, at 216-17.
73. Stanford E. Lemberg, Parliamentary Attainder in the Reign of Henry VIII, 18
HISTORICAL J. 675, 681 (1975).
74. Lemberg, supra note 73, at 692-94.
75. Id. at 694-97.
76. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 233; EDWARD COKE, THE
FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION
OF COURTS 37 (1644).
77. Steilen, supra note 50, at 821-22.
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but their availability as a means of circumventing even the outward forms of
legal process for those in bad odor with the dominant power in the state ran
contrary to the evolving British dedication to fair procedures. Bills of
attainder were not a feature of colonial America, there being no parliament
in North America and no occasion for the British parliament to attaint
colonists, at least until the American Revolution, after which the issue was
moot. However, in the immediate aftermath of American independence,
several state governments did enact bills of attainder or their substantial
equivalents against unrepentant royalists.78 These enactments were highly
controversial at the time, in part because attainders had garnered such ill
fame in British history. The U.S. constitution banned bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 9.79
IV. Impeachment in the Era of the Stuart Kings
In Great Britain, impeachment reemerged from its long dormancy
during the reigns of the Stuart kings-King James I (1603-1625), his son
Charles I (1625-1649), and his grandson Charles 11 (1649-1651, 1660-1685).
The uses of impeachment in this tumultuous period are an important key to
the American founders' understanding of the mechanism. The Stuart era was
not that far in the historical past for the delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention and their contemporaries. It was only as far behind them as the
period from the American Civil War to the First World War is for us.
Moreover, the conflicts between the Stuarts and Parliament helped define the
ideas of eighteenth century Britons, whether in the home islands or their
colonies, about proper constitutional relations between an executive and a
legislature.
James Stuart was the son of Mary, Queen of Scots, and a great-great-
grandson of King Henry VII of England.80 He became King James VI of
Scotland in 1567 when he was barely a year old, after Queen Elizabeth I
forced his mother to abdicate in his favor.81 When Elizabeth died childless
in 1603, he succeeded her as James I of England and Ireland, thus placing
England, Scotland, and Ireland under one monarch. 82 During the twenty-two
years in which he wore the three crowns of the newly consolidated kingdom,
he seems to have been a tolerably good ruler,83 leaving among other legacies
78. Id. at 880-89 (describing post-war events in Pennsylvania).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed").
80. PAULINE CROFT, KING JAMES 11 (2003).
81. Id.
82. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE NEW
WORLD 147-48 (1956).
83. CROFT, supra note 80, at 6.
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the English translation of the Bible we know as the King James Version.
84
Critically for our purposes, James' accession to the British crown coincided
with the launch of the English project of settling the east coast of North
America. In 1607, the first permanent English colony in the New World set
up shop in Virginia (so-called after Elizabeth I, the Virgin Queen) and
christened itself Jamestown, in honor of the reigning monarch. 85 From that
moment until the new United States declared independence from the parent
country in 1776, the histories and collective consciousness of Great Britain
and its children across the Atlantic were intimately intertwined.
James I believed firmly in the divine right of kings, a governmental
theory he articulated in two learned works, The True Law of Free
Monarchies 86 and the Basilikon Doron87 James' theory of kingship claimed
not only heavenly sanction for monarchical rule, but also espoused royal
absolutism. 88 Parliaments, in particular, he viewed as nothing more than
advisors to be consulted or ignored as the ruler deemed best. The authority
upon which law itself rested, in James' view, was the royal will and not any
legislative assembly. 89 In The True Law, he wrote:
The kings, therefore, in Scotland were before any estates or ranks
of men, before any parliaments were holden, or laws made, and
by them was the land distributed, which at first was wholly theirs.
And so it follows of necessity that kings were the authors and
makers of the laws, and not the laws of the kings.
90
True to his convictions, James ruled for long periods without convening
Parliament; however, he could not raise the funds necessary to support his
84. See generally DAVID NORTON, A TEXTUAL HISTORY OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE (2005).
85. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 44-45
(1965). See generally CHARLES E. HATCH, JR. THE FIRST SEVENTEEN YEARS: VIRGINIA 1607-
1624 (1957).
86. KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES: OR THE RECIPROCAL AND
MUTUAL DUTY BETWIXT A FREE KING AND HIS NATURAL SUBJECTS (Daniel Fischlin & Mark
Fortier eds., 1616) [hereinafter THE TRUE LAW]. The work was first published in Scotland 1598
and later in England upon James' accession to the English throne.
87. KING JAMES I, THE BASILIKON DORON OF KING JAMES VI (1603). The True Law was a
treatise, possibly written to counteract emerging contractarian theories of government. The
Basilikon was a sort of ruler's manual addressed to James' eldest son Henry and, after Henry's
premature death, passed on to his second son Charles, who followed James as next king of England.
ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 21.
88. 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter
HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI].
89. Id. at 20-23, 71; CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, CHARLES I 100-01 (1968).
90. KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES: AND, BASILIKON DORON 69
(Daniel Fischlin & Mark Fortier eds., 1996).
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sometimes extravagant court and pay for various military ventures without
occasionally turning to that body. 91 For their part, the notables, grandees,
and propertied men of middle station who made up Parliament were
concerned about royal finance, foreign policy, and religion.92 They were
determined that the King's spendthrift tendencies not be financed from their
purses. 93 They were at times more bellicose, particularly towards Catholic
Spain, than the King. 94 And the majority were devoutly Protestant and
deeply suspicious of any real or perceived tendency toward backsliding into
papism.
The religious conflicts of the age are of some importance to
understanding tensions between James I, his son Charles I, and their
Parliaments. Since Henry VIII's divorce from his first wife in 1533 and the
separation of the Church of England from Rome-centered Catholicism,
England had become firmly Protestant, or at least severed from the Church
of Rome. 95 However, the transition was turbulent. Henry's methods were
not gentle and stirred considerable, if fruitless, resentment. 96 From 1553-
1558, Henry's daughter Queen Mary I tried bloodily, but unsuccessfully, to
reverse the English Reformation. 97  Queen Elizabeth reaffirmed the
Protestant character of the Church, but during her long reign, adherents of
the old faith remained numerous and hopeful, even among the aristocracy.
98
James I, as a Scot, was himself a Protestant, but he was seen by some as
distressingly tolerant of Catholics and he openly sought alliance with
Catholic Spain through the marriage of his son Charles to a Spanish
princess. 99
Moreover, the spirit of the Protestant Reformation was always at least
somewhat at odds with a theory of divinely sanctioned absolute royal rule of
the sort espoused by James. 100 Kings as God's instruments made certain
sense so long as those kings ruled under the sanction of a universal Catholic
Church. But wherever the concept of a faith based on scripture accessible to
all literate persons supplanted salvation through adherence to the rules of the
91. CROFT, supra note 80, at 75-81, 93.
92. See, e.g., PETER ACKROYD, 3 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: CIVIL WAR 6-12, 22-25, 29-
36 (2014).
93. ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 143.
94. ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 144-47.
95. J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 509-16 (1968).
96. Id. at 241-354.
97. EAMON DUFFY, FIRES OF FAITH: CATHOLIC ENGLAND UNDER MARY TUDOR 79 (2009);
DAVID M. LOADES, MARY TUDOR: A LIFE (1989).
98. JENKINS, supra note 65, at 156-58, 262-63.
99. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 43, 65, 68, 73-74, 77.
100. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 128.
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Church of Rome, the foundations of absolute royal rule softened. If the truth
was discoverable through inquiry, rather than attainable only by submission
to authority, then automatic acquiescence in the whims of hereditary rulers
deserved rethinking. If the path to God ran, as the Protestants claimed, direct
from man to his maker and not through ordained intermediaries, then the
substitution of kingly intermediaries for priestly ones made poor sense.
At all events, as James I's reign progressed, tensions between crown
and parliament increased. Among the leading parliamentarians was Sir
Edward Coke, a learned judge and lawyer who believed that the common
law of England proceeded from ancient sources and, on some fundamental
points, superseded expressions of royal will. 101 This view was not admired
by the King's party and in 1616, Coke was dismissed from the bench.
10 2
Coke's leading antagonist among supporters of James and the royal
prerogative was Sir Francis Bacon, 10 3 famous to us as one of the great minds
of the age. 10 4 In 1618, the King appointed Bacon to be Lord Chancellor of
England, the highest office of the realm combining executive, judicial, and
legislative responsibilities.10 5 Three years later, in 1621, James was obliged
by extreme financial exigency to call only his third parliament since coming
to the throne in 1603.106
The parliamentarians ultimately came through with the supplies James
required, but they used their leverage to seek reforms of various deficiencies
of royal government. Among these were corruption in the system of raising
funds for the crown by granting royal licenses and monopolies on certain
kinds of trade, 10 7 and corruption and mismanagement in what were known
as courts of chancery which operated under the aegis of the Lord Chancellor
and derived their authority from the royal prerogative rather than the legal
precedents that governed the common law courts beloved of Lord Coke. 108
101. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 84; 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 428, 430, 453-54 (1931) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, VOL. V].
102. Damien X. Powell, Why was Sir Francis Bacon Impeached? The Common Lawyers and
the Chancery Revisited: 1621, 81 HISTORY 511 (1996).
103. Id. at 515-16.
104. See generally BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS BACON: AN
ESSAY ON ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM 1603 TO 1609 (1964).
105. Peter Michael Urbach, Anthony M. Quinton, and Kathleen Marguerite Lea, Francis
Bacon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.combiography/Francis-Bacon-
Viscount- Saint-Alban (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
106. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 70.
107. See JOHN BOWLE, CHARLES I 58-59 (1975).
108. See infra notes 109-110, and accompanying text. See also, ROSCOE POUND,
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 102-04 (1923) (noting long history of opposition by
Commons to courts of chancery).
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In March 1621, parliamentary investigators reported that Sir Giles
Mompesson, who presided over the licensure of inns and held the gold and
silver thread monopoly, had been up to financial shenanigans. 109 At about
the same time, a parliamentary committee investigating the chancery courts
discovered that Chancellor Bacon had been accepting generous gifts from
litigants in cases over which he presided. 10 Bacon's receipt of bribes cannot
have been a great surprise since litigant payments to judges were a common
practice of the period, frowned upon by the high-minded, but rarely the
source of any official rebuke. 11 In any case, the House of Commons, to
what must have been general astonishment, excavated the forgotten
impeachment mechanism from under a century-and-a-half of dust and used
it, first, to charge Mompesson with various forms of corruption and abuse of
authority and later to charge Bacon with multiple counts of bribery.
Mompesson was convicted and banished, after the King himself came down
to Parliament to disavow abuses of the royal grants.1 12 Bacon, perhaps
assuming that the ordinariness of his infraction would spare him any serious
punishment, confessed.'1 13 The Lords convicted him, King James was either
unwilling or unable to save his chief servant, and Bacon was stripped of his
offices and condemned to relative penury for the rest of his days. 
114
Three points emerge from these first impeachments of the Stuart period.
First, in rediscovering impeachment as a means of removing royal officials
and ministers, Parliament signaled its awakening from long torpor as a
serious legislative counterweight to royal authority, or what we would think
of as the executive branch of government. Second, impeaching Bacon was
part of a larger effort to assert the primacy of law over executive branch
absolutism. Finally, the convictions of both Mompasson and Bacon struck
blows against the misuse of government office for self-enrichment. All three
themes resonate in the present day.
At the close of James I's reign, in 1624, Parliament took another
ministerial scalp by impeaching the Earl of Middlesex, the Lord High
109. THOMAS B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 1119-32 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL,
VOL. II]. Note that the dates in HOWELL, VOL. II are different than those cited in the text. It appears
that Howell used the dates noted in the original records, and does not adjust for the official change
to the Gregorian Calendar which occurred in 1752. I.M. Kerzhner, Converting Dates from the
Julian (Old Style) or French Republican (Revolutionary) Calendars to the Gregorian (New Style)
Calendar, 33 TAXON 410 (1984).
110. HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1086-120.
111. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 59.
112. HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1125-32
113. Id. at 1102-04
114. Id. at 1112-14.
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Treasurer. The true reason of Parliament's enmity may have been the Earl's
support for James' unpopular pro-Spanish foreign policy, but he was
removed on charges of corruption. 15 Though convicted and temporarily
imprisoned and stripped of his offices, he was quickly pardoned and restored
to grace after King James died in 1625 and was succeeded by King Charles
.116
Charles I inherited his father's absolutist view of monarchy with its
attendant disdain for parliaments. That alone would have ensured some
tension between the king and the notables who populated Parliament, but
Charles seems to have had fewer political gifts than his father1 17 and he
assumed the throne in an age increasingly disinclined to unquestioning
acceptance of claims of authority, whether secular or religious. Tensions
between Charles and the parliamentarians eventually produced open warfare,
the defeat of the royalist forces by Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army,
Charles' capture,'1 18 imprisonment, and finally, in 1649, his execution.'1 19 The
details of the politics of Charles' turbulent reign are far beyond the scope of
this discussion. Instead, we will address only the use of impeachments as a
tool in the disputes between king and parliament.
In 1626, only two years after Charles' accession to the throne,
Parliament impeached George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham, who had
been a favorite, and possible lover, of James I and remained the closest
confidant of young King Charles . 120 Buckingham, a man of modest origins,
made his way into royal affection through good looks and considerable
intelligence and charm. Once firmly ensconced in royal favor, he wielded
great personal power and enriched his family and friends liberally with titles,
property, and valuable royal concessions. 121 The rapid rise of a social
climber like Villiers would have stirred resentment in any case, 122 but he was
rendered still less popular by being associated with the unsuccessful and
unpopular attempt to marry Charles to the daughter of the Catholic king of
115. BOWLE, supra note 107, 79-80; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at
354.
116. R.H. TAWNEY, BUSINESS AND POLITICS UNDER JAMES I: LIONEL CRANFIELD AS
MERCHANT AND MINISTER (1958).
117. HOLDSWORTH, Vol. VI, supra note 88, at 17.
118. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 280-81.
119. ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 216.
120. HIBBERT, supra note 89, at 29-32.
121. Id. at 31.
122. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 99-100 (describing some among the older aristocracy
complaining about "abuse of honor" by arrivistes who gained titles through royal favor or
purchase).
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Spain, 123 as well as the successful, but also controversial, marriage of Charles
to the equally Catholic French princess Henrietta Maria. 124 A number of
botched military ventures including a failed naval assault on the port of Cadiz
in 1625,125 gave Charles's second parliament an excuse to seek
Buckingham's impeachment in 1626.
King Charles, who adored Buckingham, prevented the matter from
going to trial in the House of Lords with the simple expedient of dismissing
Parliament.1 26 The charges against Buckingham, which the formal articles
of impeachment labeled "misdemeanors, offences, misprisions, and
crimes,"' 127 are nonetheless revealing for our purposes. They fall into at least
six categories: first, acquiring a "plurality of offices" that were beyond the
ability of one man to perform; second, buying, selling, or dispensing royal
offices and titles for his own benefit or that of his family; third, general
misappropriation of royal funds concealed by misuse of the king's personal
seal (the "privy seal"); fourth, mismanaging his responsibilities as Lord
Admiral of England and Ireland so that trade diminished and piracy
increased; fifth, being responsible for the loan of certain English ships to the
French king to use against Protestant Huguenots at Rochelle; and sixth,
suggesting that King James take some useless medicines during his final
illness. 128
Few, if any, of these would have been considered either ordinary crimes
or treason against the crown. Unauthorized use of the privy seal, if proven,
might have fit into either or both categories. Buying and selling offices may
under certain circumstances have violated the law, but it was perfectly legal
in many situations and was at worst a venial offense in those days. 129 And
there is no indication that either James I or Charles I disapproved of
Buckingham's activities. The charges involving naval matters express
parliamentary outrage on two points-Buckingham's persistent military
incompetence or misfortune and Protestant parliamentarians' suspicion that
the courts of both James I and Charles I were soft on Catholicism. But
neither allegation made out either a crime or treason. The business about the
123. PEREZ ZAGORIN, THE COURT AND THE COUNTRY: THE BEGINNING OF THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION 63 (1969).
124. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 108-09.
125. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 95-96.
126. Id. at 100.
127. HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1308.
128. Id. at 1307-21.
129. PEREZ ZAGORIN, REBELS AND RULERS 1500-1660: SOCIETIES, STATES AND EARLY
MODERN REVOLUTION 100 (1982); Douglas W. Allen, Purchase, Patronage, and Professions:
Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL
THEORETICAL ECON. 57 (2003), http://www.sfu.ca/-allen/venality.pdf; John Miller, The Potential
for 'Absolutism' in Later Stuart England, 69 HISTORY 187 (1984).
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medicines was merely a nasty, but almost certainly baseless, insinuation that
Buckingham had tried to poison the old king.
In sum, Parliament believed impeachment to be proper for ministers
who employed the powers of office for self-enrichment, grossly mismanaged
their governmental responsibilities, or betrayed the fundamental interests of
the country in dealings with foreign powers. Buckingham's impeachment
has been said to have decisively "negatived Charles I's contention that not
only was he personally above the law, but also his ministers acting at his
orders." 130  But it is not clear that Buckingham's true offenses were
violations of law in the conventional sense. There were instead offenses
against what the notable personages who made up Parliament perceived to
be the proper constitutional relationship between themselves and the crown,
and also against parliamentarians' ideas of proper national policy.
Charles managed to forestall further use of impeachments against his
ministers for the next fourteen years by keeping parliaments infrequent and
short in duration. 131 But in 1640, financial exigencies forced Charles to
reconvene Parliament and accede to an Act stipulating that it could not be
dissolved without the consent of its members. 132 That body, known as the
Long Parliament, remained formally in session until 1660 and did not
dissolve even during the war that dethroned King Charles. 
133
When Parliament assembled in September 1640, King Charles was not
only in financial distress, but was facing armed rebellion by his Scottish
subjects, political chaos in Ireland, and widespread dissension in England. 134
The leaders of the newly assembled legislature, knowing that the king's
situation was desperate, were determined to use their leverage to make
significant reforms. 135 They resolved to reassert parliamentary control over
taxation and revenue. Many of them were concerned that the king's
dedication to the Protestant religion was suspect and distressed at the
130. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 382.
131. Parliaments, 1604-1629 The reigns of James I and Charles, THE HISTORY OF
PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/parliaments/parliaments- 1604-
1629 (last visited July 18, 2018); Parliaments, 1640-1660 Civil War, Commonwealth and
Protectorate, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/
parliaments/parliaments-1640-1660 (last visited July 18, 2018). However, in 1637 Parliament did
impeach a group of judges for ruling that it was lawful for the King to collect the so-called ship
money tax without the consent of Parliament. D.L. Keir, The Case of Ship Money, 52 L.Q. REV.
546 (1936); T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL. III].
132. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 177-78.
133. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 360-61.
134. Craig S. Lerner, Impeachment, Attainder, and a True Constitutional Crisis: Lessons from
the Strafford Trial 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 2057, 2062 (2002).
135. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 112-14, 135-36.
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aggressive hostility of his ecclesiastical appointees like Archbishop of
Canterbury William Laud to the religious reform movement we know as
Puritanism. 136 Most fundamentally, the parliamentarians rejected Charles'
disposition to personal rule. In modern terms, their quarrel with Charles was
a constitutional argument. Charles believed he was anointed by God to
govern subject to no lesser authority. 137 Parliament viewed the monarch as
a pillar of the state, to be sure, but also as constrained by the law enacted by
Parliament in statutes and declared by judges of the common law courts. 138
In their view of the law, the leaders of the Long Parliament were
intellectual heirs of Sir Edward Coke, who had died in 1634,139 but whose
influence had if anything grown since his falling-out with James I in 1616.
Accordingly, they sought to reform the legal system, in particular the
practices of two special courts, the Court of Star Chamber 140 and the Court
of High Commission, 141 which derived their authority from the royal
prerogative rather than either common or statutory law. The Court of Star
Chamber enforced Charles' proclamations, which it held to have the force of
law. 142 The Court of High Commission was the highest religious court in
England, but also had wide civil jurisdiction.1 43 Its powers seem to have
been wielded particularly aggressively against Puritans and others disposed
to reform of the established church, a faction increasingly well-represented
in Parliament.
The parliamentarians abolished the Courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission in 1641,144 but recognized that their program also required
removing or neutering the King's most powerful ministers and retainers.
Accordingly, they deployed impeachments liberally in the first three years
of the Long Parliament, bringing at least twenty sets of charges against more
136. Id.
137. C.V. WEDGEWOOD, A COFFIN FOR KING CHARLES 4 (1964).
138. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 133-34.
139. See generally CATHARINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE: 1552-1634 (1990).
140. Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HISTORY REV. 727, 746-50
(1913).
141. JOHN SOUTHERDEN BURN, THE HIGH COMMISSION: NOTICES OF THE COURT AND ITS
PROCEEDINGS (1865), https:/Ibabel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hx3iig;view=lup;seq=5.
142. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 31.
143. See generally BURN, supra note 141.
144. Cheyney, supra note 140, at 750; THE ACT FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF STAR
CHAMBER (1641), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN
REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 176-80 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1906), http://oll.libertyfund.or
g/pages/1641-the-act-for-the-abolition-of-the-court-of-star-chamber; THE ACT FOR THE
ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF HIGH COMMISSION (1641), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 181-83 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed.,
1906), http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1641 -the-act-for-the-abolition-of-the-court-of-high-commission.
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than thirty individual defendants.1 45 The impeachments of 1640 and 1641
are perhaps of most current significance because they struck both at the
King's most able retainers and through them at his theory of kingship.
King Charles' most forceful and energetic secular official was Thomas
Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. 146 Curiously, before joining the King's party
and rising to an earldom, Wentworth had been a member of the House of
Commons himself, was an active supporter of the 1628 Petition of Right
(which endeavored to set limits on royal power), 147 and had even been
imprisoned in the Tower of London for refusing to pay the "forced loans"
Charles used early in his reign to finance his government. 148 However, as
soon the Petition of Right passed Parliament and was (grudgingly) accepted
by Charles, Wentworth switched sides. 149 Once committed to the King's
cause, Earl Strafford, nde Wentworth, became an ardent defender of the royal
prerogative and the most effective instrument of Charles' preferred absolutist
mode of governance. In Ireland, where he served as the Lord Deputy
(essentially the king's viceroy) beginning in 1633, Strafford was particularly
aggressive in using prerogative power to sweep away opposition to a
program of ruthlessly efficient administration.1 50 Recalled to England in
1639, Strafford urged the King to adopt the same sorts of unyielding tactics
that had proven successful in Ireland.151 The English proved less tractable.
King Charles' most prominent servant among the churchmen was
William Laud, consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury and thus head under
Charles himself of the Church of England. 152 Laud was determined to
regularize religious practice and to stamp out dissenters of a Puritan bent.
The particulars of his religious project are of less importance than his
methods because he shared with Strafford authoritarian instincts and disdain
for any law not founded on the will of the King. Laud ruthlessly wielded
prerogative courts like the Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber to
suppress those he felt to be enemies of true religion or its royal head. 153 For
example, in 1637, William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Burton were
145. STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 159.
146. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 73-77; C.V. WEDGWOOD, THOMAS
WENTWORTH FIRST EARL OF STRAFFORD, 1593 -1641: A REVALUATION (1961).
147. See Harold Hulme, Opinion in the House of Commons on the Proposal for a Petition of
Right, 6 May, 1628, L THE ENG. HIST. REV. 302, 302-06 (1935); HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra
note 88, at 74-75.
148. LERNER, supra note 134, at 2064-65.
149. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 139.
150. HUGH F. KEARNEY, STRAFFORD IN IRELAND, 1633-41: A STUDY IN ABSOLUTISM (2d ed.
1989).
151. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 186-87, 192.
152. See generally CHARLES CARLTON, ARCHBISHOP WILLIAM LAUD (1987).
153. Id. at77-80.
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all sentenced to have their ears cut off for libeling the Church and its
bishops. 154
Laud was a regular correspondent with Strafford and the two
commiserated over the impediment to royal government presented by the
pestilential common law lawyers and courts. In 1633, just before becoming
Archbishop of Canterbury, Laud wrote Wentworth in Ireland and warned
him not to expect too much assistance from Laud in his new position
because, "the Church it is so bound up in the forms of the Common Law,
that it is not possible for me, or for any Man to do that good which he would,
or is bound to do." 155 In his reply, Strafford expressed his determination that
the king's objectives would not be thwarted by the common law courts,
declaring that he would not rest until he saw his royal "Master's power and
greatness set out of wardship and above the exposition of Sir Edward Coke
and his Year Books." 156 In the ensuing years, both men became, if anything,
less tolerant of legalistic opposition to their projects and more committed to
the king's absolute authority.
Shortly after Parliament convened in the fall of 1640, the Commons
impeached Strafford on charges of high treason. The articles are long,
detailed, and at times delve into seemingly trivial matters, but they allege
five general theories: first, that Strafford, through both his advice to the king
and his personal actions had attempted to "subvert the fundamental laws and
government of the realms of England and Ireland, and instead thereof, to
introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law"; 157 second,
that he corruptly enriched himself;158 third, that he colluded with Catholics
to encourage that religion and to secure Catholic support in his "tyrannical
designs"; 159 fourth, that he mismanaged the unsuccessful military sally
against the invading Scots in mid-1640; 160 and fifth that he had counseled
the king to bring an Irish army to England to make war on his subjects. 161
154. BOWLE, supra note 107, at 149-50.
155. Letter from Wm. Laud to Thomas Wentworth, Lord Deputy (Sept. 9, 1633), reprinted in
GEORGE RADCLIFFE, THE EARL OF STRAFFORD'S LETTERS AND DISPATCHES 111 (1739).
156. G.M. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 396 (1956); RICHARD
BAGWELL, IRELAND UNDER THE STUARTS AND DURING THE INTERREGNUM, VOL. 1 1603-1642,
at 192 (1909).
157. HOWELL, VOL. III supra note 131, at 1385-86 (noting this is a quote from article one of
the first summary articles of impeachment levied against Strafford).
158. Id. at 1386. This is the essence of article three of the first summary articles of
impeachment, expanded on at length in supplemental articles seemingly filed later, particularly
articles nine through fourteen. Id. at 1391-94.
159. Id. at 1386.
160. Id.
161. This charge has always been controversial because it turned on interpretation of an
ambiguous statement by Strafford that could have meant either that the Irish army should be used
to confront the Scots forced mustered in the north, or that it should be used to suppress dissidents
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Note that these articles include two types of charges prominent in
Buckingham's case and other earlier impeachments-abuse of office for
self-enrichment and mismanagement of government or military affairs. The
novelty in Strafford's impeachment is the charge of promoting tyranny
through subversion of law. What makes this allegation particularly striking
is that it depended on Coke's view that law exists independent of the will of
the King. Everyone knew that all Strafford's actions were taken with the
King's sanction in pursuit of the King's policies. Thus, the "arbitrary and
tyrannical government against law" 16 2 Strafford was accused of promoting
was the absolute rule of the king administered through unaccountable
ministers and prerogative courts. The articles also alleged that Strafford
promoted tyranny by encouraging the king to dismiss Parliament. 163 In
effect, Commons charged Strafford with high treason for putting into action
Charles' theory of kingship. 164 Even the charge that Strafford had urged
Charles to bring the "foreign" Irish army to England to levy war against the
people only makes sense if one believes that a king has no right to use force
against rebellious subjects.
All the allegations in Strafford's articles of impeachment were
particulars in the overarching capital charge of high treason. As multiple
commentators have observed, this necessarily implied the existence of two
theories of treason-there could be treasons against the person of the
monarch, but also treason against the constitution of the state.165 John Pym,
leader of the Commons, argued when prosecuting Stafford before the House
of Lords, that "this crime of subverting the laws, and introducing an arbitrary
and tyrannical government, is contrary to the pact and covenant between a
King and his people ... the legal union of allegiance and protection." 166 He
added that, "to alter the settled frame and constitution of government is
treason in any state."
' 167
Despite Pym's confident declaration, the Lords hesitated to convict to
Strafford, in part because Strafford was able to refute the factual basis of
some charges and, as some scholars have argued, in part because there was
lingering doubt that what Strafford had done amounted to treason as
in England itself. The first reading would have been unobjectionable, and as noted, even the second
was treason only if one believed that a king may not use force against his own rebellious subjects.
162. HOWELL, VOL. III, supra note 131, at 1385-86.
163. Id. at 1388-89.
164. D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 61 (2002)("Essentially, Strafford stood trial for his role in Charles I's personal
rule of 1629-40 ...").
165. BERGER, supra note 10, at 33.
166. 8 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE PASSAGES OF STATE,
WEIGHTY MATTERS IN LAW, REMARKABLE PROCEEDINGS IN FIVE PARLIAMENTS 666 (1721).
167. Id. at 669.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
previously defined by law. 168 Twentieth century lawyer and politician F.E.
Smith, Lord Birkenhead, himself a Lord Chancellor of England, maintained
that in helping Charles to, "substitute arbitrary government for the rule of
law," Strafford committed a "high crime" and a "heinous" offense, but not
the technical crime of treason because his behavior did not violate the statute
defining treason. 169 In the end, for reasons not fully understood, Parliament
abandoned the Commons' articles of impeachment and substituted a bill of
attainder alleging high treason on the same grounds. It passed both
houses. 170 Unlike an impeachment, attainder required the consent of the
sovereign, but Charles yielded to pressure, gave his assent, and Strafford was
beheaded on May 12, 1641.71
The Commons moved against Archbishop Laud at the same time as
Strafford. Laud, too, was arrested and impeached by the House of Commons
for high treason in December 1640,172 but he was imprisoned and his trial
was delayed until 1644.173 Several sets of articles of impeachment were
prepared against Laud, but both sets mirrored those against Strafford in
168. See generally ORR, supra note 164, at 62.
169. Lord Birkenhead observed:
Was Strafford guilty of treason? The answer in strict law must clearly be in the
negative. Treason is an offence against the allegiance due to the Sovereign in aid
and counsel. The underlying theory of the Commons that there were fundamental
laws, and that to aim at overturning them was treason, is erroneous. In legal theory
there are in this country no laws, not even the Act of Settlement or the Act of Union,
which Parliament may not alter as easily as a Statute providing for by-laws in a
country parish. To break the law is a crime. To break the laws upon which civil
liberty depends is a high crime. But to call treason that which falls clearly outside
the terms of the Statute of Treason does not justify a conviction. He was charged
with treason, but at best the evidence proved offences, heinous indeed to the last
degree, but not treasonable. Nevertheless, if one sets aside the purely legal aspect
of the case and regards it from the wider standpoint, there can be little doubt that
Charles and his advisers were working to substitute arbitrary government for the
rule of law. Strafford had shown himself to be a grave menace to the constitution,
and in that untechnical sense he was a traitor.
F.E. SMITH, EARL OF BIRKENHEAD, FAMOUS TRIALS OF HISTORY 44-45 (1926). More recent
commentators have taken the opposite view, see, e.g., ORR, supra note 164, at 61-100.
170. ACKROYD, supra note 92, 210, 213.
171. Id. at 98.
172. See 4 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 315 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL.
IV]; CARLTON, supra note 120, at 200-01.
173. Id. at214.
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critical respects. 174 The principal charge, repeated in various forms, was that
Laud had committed treason by endeavoring to set up an arbitrary and
tyrannical government, destroy Parliament, and subvert the rule of law.
1 75
The primary difference between the Laud and Strafford impeachment
charges was that Laud was alleged to have promoted tyrannical government
primarily in the ecclesiastical sphere of the king's sovereignty, while
Strafford's transgressions fell in the secular realm. 176 The technical treason
case against Laud was, if anything, weaker than that against Strafford. Laud
had no military authority and could not be charged with marshaling foreign
armies against the people. His actions, however brutal, high-handed, and
subversive of Parliament and the common law courts, were taken both with
the King's sanction and through established institutions like the courts of
Star Chamber and High Commission. Indeed, it was explicitly argued on
Laud's behalf that, though the allegations against him may indeed have been
"crimes and misdemeanors," they were not in law treason. 177 Nonetheless,
Parliament viewed Laud as a dangerous pillar of the King's disposition to
absolutism. In late October 1643, Commons suddenly abandoned the formal
impeachment process and drew up a bill of attainder asserting that the
charges in Laud's impeachment had been proven, thus meriting his attainder
for high treason.1 78 Both houses passed the bill in January 1644, rejected a
pardon of the Archbishop the King had issued the previous year by deeming
it invalid against parliamentary condemnation, and sent Laud to the
executioner. 179
Charles I's conflict with his Parliament degenerated into the English
Civil War (1642-1651) and led to his own execution, the kingless
Commonwealth of England (1649-1660), the Cromwell Protectorate, and
finally in 1660 the restoration of the English monarchy under Charles 11.180
Although Parliament invited the Stuart monarchs back to the throne, it
remained protective of its own authority and suspicious of royal overreach.
One of Charles II's chief ministers, the Earl of Clarendon, a stout monarchist,
fell afoul of his political enemies in Parliament beginning in 1663. Two
174. Apparently, there is some doubt about the exact terms of the articles, due in part to the
absence of contemporaneous records and in part to the fact that Laud's trial did not occur for five
years after his arrest and multiple sets of charges seem to have been drawn against him. Id. at 217.
175. HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 321-30 (articles passed by Commons in December
1640); id. at 332-36 (additional articles passed in October 1643). He was also accused of
subverting the Protestant faith in England and promoting Catholicism, as well as bribery.
176. ORR, supra note 163, at 101-02.
177. HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 585; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 218, 222.
178. HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 599; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 223.
179. HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 600; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 223.
180. See generally RICHARD CUST, CHARLES I: A POLITICAL LIFE (2005); HIBBERT, supra
note 89.
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efforts were made to impeach him: the first was widely deemed frivolous,
but the second, in 1667, succeeded in driving him from office.181 The
primary charges in the second impeachment involved supposed advice to the
king to raise a standing army and govern through it rather than Parliament,
seeking money for the crown from France in order to evade parliamentary
control of royal finance, and abuses of habeas corpus for sending prisoners
out of England and holding them without trial. 182 The parallels to the cases
of Strafford and Laud are plain; again the essence of the allegations was that
Clarendon was subverting the constraints on monarchy imposed by the
elected parliament and the common law. Clarendon's impeachment was
technically unresolved because he fled to France before final votes could be
taken in the House of Lords, but Parliament thereafter passed a bill of
banishment to keep him out of the country.
183
The final notable impeachment under the Stuart kings was that of the
Earl of Danby in 1678. Still at loggerheads with Parliament over finance,
Charles II authorized Danby to write letters to an intermediary, offering the
French king British neutrality in the Franco-Dutch war for a huge cash
annuity paid to Charles. 184 When the letters leaked, Parliament promptly
impeached Danby for treason. 185 The form of the charge was in one respect
strikingly similar to those against Clarendon, Laud, and Strafford in that he
was alleged to have "endeavored to subvert the ancient and well established
form of government in this kingdom, and instead thereof to introduce an
arbitrary and tyrannical way of government."1 86  The essence of the
complaint was also similar to prior impeachments in that Commons was
perturbed that Danby was simultaneously attempting to circumvent
parliamentary control over the king's revenue and carrying out a pro-French
foreign policy which many parliamentarians believed contrary to the
country's interests. The Lords were markedly reluctant to convict a minister
for treason for carrying out the king' s policy, however obnoxious they found
that policy to be, but the matter was not resolved because the King prorogued
Parliament to stop the proceedings. A later Parliament, nonetheless, revived
181. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 398-400.
182. 6 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 330-34 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL,
VOL. VI]. Clarendon was also charged with the by-now customary allegations of corruption and
official incompetence. Id. at 333-34.
183. See Clayton Roberts, The Impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon, 13 CAMBRIDGE HIST.
J. 1, 15 (1957); HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 174-78.
184. 11 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 600-18 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL,
VOL. XI].
185. Id. at 619-21.
186. Id. at 620-27.
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the charges and ruled that an attempt by the King to pardon Danby was
ineffective against an impeachment. 187 In the end, Danby spent some years
in custody before the whole business was dropped. 188
V. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Last Large Flurry
of British Impeachments (1715-1716)
The last king of the Stuart lineage was James 11. 189 His Catholicism and
various of his policies proved so obnoxious to leading elements in Parliament
and England at large, that they invited William of Orange the statholder of
the Netherlands and husband of Mary (James II's daughter) to invade and
assume the British crown jointly with Mary.1 90 He did so, successfully and
largely bloodlessly, in 1688. The removal of James II and ascendance of
William and Mary became known as the "Glorious Revolution." 191 It is
important for our purposes, primarily because a condition of William and
Mary's assumption of the throne was the passage and acceptance by the
crown of a Bill of Rights that codified increased parliamentary authority at
the expense of royal prerogatives.'1 92 Although the transition would not be
complete for many years, the Glorious Revolution is commonly said to be
the beginning of constitutional monarchy in Britain. Accordingly, as
ministers and officials became less and less agents of the monarchs and more
and more the creatures of Parliament, impeachment assumed decreasing
importance.
There was a flurry of impeachments in 1715-1716 occasioned by the
turmoil caused by the death in 1714 of Queen Anne, the daughter and
successor of William and Mary,1 93 and the accession of George I, a
187. BERGER, supra note 10, at 45.
188. ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 451.
189. Stuart Family Tree, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education
/resources/jacobite- 1715/stuart- family-tree/.
190. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 59; HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra
note 88, at 193-94; DAVID OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES II AND WWLIAM III (2nd ed.
1957).
191. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 59. See generally JR. JONES, THE
REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND (1988).
192. HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 240-43; KEITH, supra note 30, at 8-9
(enumerating the provisions of the Bill of Rights of 1689).
193. Mary died of smallpox in 1694. Abbas M. Behbehani, The Smallpox Story: Life and
Death of an Old Disease, 47 MICROBIOLOGICAL REV. 455,458 (1983), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.g
ov/pmc/articles/PMC281588/pdf/microrev00019-0005.pdf. William continued to reign until his
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Hanoverian prince who assumed the throne only because he was Anne's
closest Protestant relative. 94 Anne's death raised hopes for restoration of a
Catholic monarchy in the person of James Francis Edward Stuart, the "Old
Pretender." The result was armed rebellion in Scotland, known as the
Jacobite Rising of 1715, which was joined by a number of Scottish peers.' 95
When the rising failed, seven peers were impeached for high treason and
several were executed.1 96 Likewise, after George I was installed on the
throne, parliamentary critics of the foreign policy pursued under Queen Anne
impeached the Earl of Oxford, Viscount Bolingbroke, and the Earl of
Strafford in 1715 for giving "pernicious" advice to the queen to enter into
the Treaty of Utrecht in the War of the Spanish Succession.'
1 97
VI. The Impeachment of Warren Hastings
Impeachment largely disappeared from the British scene once the issue
of parliamentary supremacy was settled by the Glorious Revolution and its
aftermath, and the issue of Protestant succession was firmly resolved by the
accession of George I and the failure of the Jacobite rising of 1715. The only
notable exception was the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Governor
General of India, that, by happenstance, was beginning just as the
Philadelphia convention commenced in 1787.
At the time Americans achieved independence, there had not been an
impeachment of a Crown official for misconduct in office since 1725198 and
death in 1702 after a fall from a horse. 8 RICHARD LODGE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
RESTORATION TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III 450 (1910).
194. ANDREW C. THOMPSON, GEORGE II: KING AND ELECTOR 95 (2011).
195. 15 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1129, 1159 (1816) [hereinafter
HOWELL, VOL. XV].
196. HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 762, 806; SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 150-51.
197. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 62; BERGER, supra note 10, at 71-72. The charges against
Oxford and Bolingbroke were couched as both treason and high crimes and misdemeanors.
Strafford's charges were labeled high crimes and misdemeanors. Bolingbroke was attainted and
later pardoned. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 152. Strafford was never tried. Id. at 156. Oxford was
tried and acquitted. Id. at 162. In addition, in 1715, the Duke of Ormond was impeached for
treasonous collusion with French forces while acting as commander of British forces in the
Netherlands during the war. HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 1007.
198. In 1725, the Earl of Macclesfield was impeached, convicted, fined, and imprisoned for
corruption during his term as Lord Chancellor. 16 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
767-68 (1816). The impeachment procedure was also employed in 1746 to try and execute Simon
Fraser, Lord Lovat, for his role in the Scottish rebellion of 1745. 18 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 529-857 (1816). Lovat's demise differed from the sorts of impeachment that
concern us here because the choice of the impeachment vehicle had nothing to do with imposing
legislative constraint on crown policy or removing a corrupt minister. Lord Lovat was a peer of
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the practice was on the verge of becoming a mere relic of an earlier age.
However, complaints about Hastings' conduct in India had been brewing
since his retirement and return to Great Britain in 1785. In April 1786, the
great orator, conservative essayist,199 and supporter of American liberties,0 0
Edmund Burke, presented specific accusations against Hastings in the House
of Commons.0 1  On May 10, 1787, Commons approved articles of
impeachment202 and on May 21, 1787, less than a week before the
Philadelphia convention was called to order on May 27, Hastings was
arrested and taken before the House of Lords to hear the charges. 0 3
Hastings' impeachment trial before the Lords did not begin until
February 1788, and it dragged on at irregular intervals for seven years until,
in April 1795, he was acquitted on all charges. 0 4 The verdict is unimportant
for our purposes because it was handed down long after the American
constitution was ratified in 1788, and thus could have had no influence on
either the Philadelphia drafters or the state ratifiers of the American
impeachment mechanism. But the existence of the Hastings impeachment
and the nature of the charges were well-known in 1787-88, and, as mentioned
at the outset of this Article, they were specifically mentioned in the key
exchange between George Mason and James Madison that produced the
constitutional definition of impeachable conduct: "treason, bribery, or other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors. '"205
Hastings' case was a cause cdldbre throughout the English-speaking
world, and was of particular fascination to newly independent Americans
because it centered on Hastings' conduct as the chief administrative officer
of the major British colonial possessions outside of the western
hemisphere-the growing accumulation of territory that would in time
become the Indian Raj. From 1772 to 1785, Hastings had served as the first
Governor General of British territories and interests in India.z°6 The position
the realm who had taken up arms against the king and, according to the law of the time, could only
be condemned to death by trial in the House of Lords. Hence, his impeachment.
199. Perhaps Burke's most famous written work was EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790).
200. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC LIBERTY 102, 161-62 (1976);
CHARLES R. RITCHESON, EDMUND BURKE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976), https://www
.questia.com/read/1 1097739/edmund-burke-and-the-american-revolution.
201. SMITH, supra note 169, at 168-69.
202. Id. at 170.
203. PATRICK TURNBULL, WARREN HASTINGS 205 (1975).
204. 4 SPEECHES OF THE MANAGERS AND COUNSEL IN TRIAL OF WARREN HASTINGS, at lxiv-
lxviii (E.A. Bonded., 1861).
205. See FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550; THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION: FULLY REVISED 293 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014).
206. LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 135 (1994).
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was created to centralize administration of what was, at the time, a hodge-
podge of territorial possessions, trading concessions, and treaty relationships
with indigenous rulers across the Indian subcontinent largely conducted by
and through the British East India Company.20 7 The Company was to
modern eyes an anomalous creature. It was, in part, a private corporation
and trading venture, but it also behaved as a government with a huge private
army drawing its authority from acts of Parliament, grants from or treaties
with native Indian rulers, or simple right of conquest. 20 8 The Company's
critics viewed it as exploitative and tending to corrupt both the regions it
ruled, and politics back home.20 9 The creation of the office of Governor
General and Hastings' appointment to that post were part of an effort to
restrain the Company's excesses and bring its activities and possessions
under more direct control by the British government.210
Hastings' supporters, both at the time and since, viewed him as an
earnest, hardworking, aggressive, and on the whole successful administrator
who laid the foundation for British control of India and integration of its
possessions there into a system of empire. His critics saw in him the
personification of the errors and excesses of imperialism and attributed to
him both personal corruption and egregious abuses of authority.211 The
twenty-two articles of impeachment against Hastings charged him with a
miscellany of misbehavior,212 including disregard of instructions from the
Company's directors,213 mismanagement of regions under his administrative
control (often to the disadvantage of the native population), 214 high-handed
207. KEITH, supra note 30, at 512-13. See generally JOHN KEAY, THE HONORABLE
COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (1993).
208. SMITH, supra note 169, at 164.
209. Id. at 164-68. See also The East India Company: The Company that ruled the waves, THE
ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2011), https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials /2011/12/17/the-
company-that-ruled-the-waves.
210. See generally Neil Sen, Warren Hastings and British Sovereign Authority in Bengal, 25
J. OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY 59 (1987).
211. SMITH, supra note 169, at 165-76.
212. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 167-88.
213. For example, the seventh article alleges that Hastings violated Company policy in favor
of securing goods and services through publicly advertised solicitations with the "most reasonable
proposal" to be accepted when he entered into a contract with George Templer for draught animals
and provisions at rates 30% higher than a competing proposal. Id. at 173. Articles ten and eleven
allege other violations of company contracting policies. Id. at 174-75. Articles nine and ten also
relate to Hasting's alleged disregard of instructions from the Company board. Id. at 174.
214. Articles five and sixteen allege mismanagement of the affairs of the provinces of
Farmckabad and Oude. Id. at 177.
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or deceitful dealings with local rulers, 215 misconduct of local wars?2 16 and
allegations of corruption benefiting either Hastings himself or other
Company officials.2 17 A cynic might characterize most of the charges as
merely behaving like an efficient imperialist. None of the charges could
fairly be classed as criminal conduct in any technical sense. Even the
allegations of corruption were phrased so vaguely that it would have been
impossible to frame them within any existing criminal statute. The essence
of the claims against him was abuse of official power. This feature of the
articles was so patent that their principle author, Edmund Burke, was obliged
to expend his eloquence contending that Hastings' offenses were against
natural law or ancestral principles of the British constitution rather than any
particular statute. In his opening statement, Burke said the charges against
Hastings "were crimes, not against forms, but against those eternal laws of
justice, which are our rule and our birthright. His offenses are not, in formal,
technical language, but in reality, in substance and effect, High Crimes and
High Misdemeanors. 2 18
Burke's description of Hastings' offenses is important not merely
because it confirms, once again, that in British practice impeachable offenses
need not have been indictable crimes. In addition, Burke's words, together
with other facts about the Hastings case, illuminate a broader point. Note
that Commons voted to impeach Hastings not to remove an obnoxious
official from office, nor to hobble the policy of a willful monarch. Hastings
had already resigned his office and retired two years before his
impeachment. 219 And by 1787, Great Britain was already a parliamentary
monarchy in which the personal authority of the king was largely subordinate
to the parliamentary majority. Thus, the impeachment of Hastings only
makes sense if some other objective was in view.
Certainly, one cannot ignore that the move against Hastings had
immediate political objectives. For opponents of the government of William
215. Articles two through six, as well as articles fourteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and
twenty-two, fall generally in this category. Id. at 168-73, 176-81, 185-88.
216. Article one alleges that Hastings violated instructions not to engage in "any offensive war
whatever" by instigating and employing British troops in a war against the Rohilla people. Id. at
167-68. Article fourteen relates to a war between Ranna of Gohud and Madajee Scindia. Id. at
176. Article twenty concerns a war with the Mahrattas. Id. at 182-84.
217. Articles eight and sixteen allege personal or collective corruption. Id. at 174, 177.
218. EDMUND BURKE, ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND REFORM: SPEECHES AND LETTERS 388
(David Bromwich ed., 2000).
219. THOMAS BABBINGTON MACAULAY, Warren Hastings, in 1 CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ESSAYS (A.J. Grieve ed., 1907), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2332/2332-h/2332-h.htm.
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Pitt the Younger, Hastings was a convenient whipping boy.2 20 But Burke, at
least, had larger aims. For him and like-minded others, the Hastings case
was an opportunity to establish fundamental points about the nature of the
emerging British Empire, the standards of conduct to be expected of
government servants of that Empire, and the rights of the Empire's
subjects.221  In this sense, Burke's impeachment of Hastings was a
continuance of his arguments before the American Revolution in favor of
colonists' enjoyment of the traditional rights of Englishmen. In framing the
charges against Hastings, Burke was asserting that the Empire would be a
unitary whole in which officials would be subject to central authority and
obliged to operate in accordance with the rule of statutory law and natural
justice. And he was making bold claims for the rights of British subjects,
regardless of national origin. Perhaps the most notable feature of Burke's
charges against Hastings is their insistence that the primary victims of
Hastings' alleged misbehavior were, not Englishmen or British commercial
interests, but the indigenous rulers and inhabitants of India. Burke does not
deny that Britain may rule an Empire, but he insists that the peoples under
its sway not be robbed, exploited, or impoverished.
Whether this view carried the day in the Hastings impeachment or in
the development of the British Empire after the 1780s is not important for
our purposes. The key point is that, at the same moment Americans were
redesigning their government in Philadelphia, Burke was using impeachment
as a vehicle, not for the chastisement of one man, but to establish basic
constitutional principles-and important Americans were aware of his
efforts and wanted a similar power for themselves.
VII. Lessons of British Impeachments for American Practice
British impeachment practice is important for students of the American
constitution because the Framers were conscious heirs to British traditions
of representative government and because at Philadelphia they settled on
language to define the scope of impeachable conduct-"Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"-drawn directly from British
impeachment precedents.222 As noted at the outset, whether the Framers
220. Chris Monaghan, In Defence of Intrinsic Human Rights: Edmund Burke's Controversial
Prosecution of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, 2 L., CRIME AND HISTORY 58, 63-
64 (2011), http://lawcrimehistory.org/joumal/vol. 1%20issue2%20201 1/Monaghan.pdf.
221. P.J. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS 15-16 (1965). See
generally THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, WARREN HASTINGS (1886); JOHN MORLEY,
EDMUND BURKE, A HISTORICAL STUDY (1924).
222. This phrase also appears in some American impeachments of the colonial and post-
Revolution-but-pre-Constitution periods. Those impeachments and their likely effect on the
Founders' thinking are discussed in Chapter Three of BOWMAN, HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS, supra note 11.
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meant to adopt British language, particularly the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors," as a term of art tightly restricting the scope of American
impeachments by reference to British practice, and if that was their intention,
whether we should honor it, are questions for another time. For the moment,
it is necessary only to ascertain how the British understood impeachment,
because a proper reading of British precedents sets the baseline minimum for
the scope of American impeachments. We can fairly draw at least the
following conclusions.
A. Impeachment, Crime, Treason, and Retrospective
Punishment
As noted above, a persistent conundrum of British impeachment
proceedings arose from the dual character of impeachment. It was a political
tool, but was also criminal insofar as conviction triggered severe personal
penalties far beyond mere removal from office. Thus, the growing
parliamentary resistance to absolutist royal rule and affinity for government
under statutory and common law that produced some of the most memorable
impeachments necessarily implied that even politically dangerous ministers
ought not be personally punished for conduct not previously specified as
illegal. This tension existed in all British impeachments, but was most acute
when treason was among the charges.
Indeed, many parliamentary arguments about retrospective or
declaratory treason seem to have been driven primarily by concern about the
extreme penalties for conviction on that ground. Those impeached for
treason, or their parliamentary defenders, were often heard to argue that they
may well have committed crimes, even serious ones, but not treason.223 The
real issue in many such cases seems to have been that Commons wanted, not
merely removal of an obnoxious minister from office, but also his physical
and civil death in the form of execution and/or deprivation of lands, titles,
and wealth. The technical arguments about whether an accused's conduct
fell within previous definitions of treason often seem driven by resistance,
223. Among the numerous instances of this phenomenon are: (1) the statement of Charles I
when he went to the House of Lords to intercede on behalf of Lord Strafford that, "I cannot
condemn him of High-Treason; yet I cannot say I clear him of Misdemeanor." HOWELL, VOL. III,
supra note 131, at 1513; 2 WILLIAM COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 755
(1807); 5 JAMES MCINTOSH, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 253 (1835). (2) The statement of the Bishop
of Lincoln, a member of the House of Lords during the 1715 impeachment trial of the Earl of
Oxford for treason, that, "To high crimes and misdemeanours I could readily agree, and I hoped,
and therefore wished, that their prosecution might have stopped there. The H[ouse] of Commons
have gone further." Clyve Jones, The Opening of the Impeachment of Robert Harley, Earl of
Oxford, June to September 1715: The 'Memorandum' of William Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, 4
ELECTRONIC BRITISH LIBRARY J. 4, 7 (2015).
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particularly among the Lords, against the idea that faithful service to an
erring King could result not merely in removal from office, but extinction.
For example, it has been argued that the last-minute switch from
impeachment to attainder in the 1640 cases of both Lord Strafford and
Archbishop Laud, and the absence of formal convictions in the House of
Lords in later impeachments, arose from the Lords' reluctance to impeach
officials for treason for conduct not clearly treasonous under existing law.
But to draw this conclusion from the Strafford and Laud affairs is to ignore
their ultimate fates-in both cases, both houses of Parliament approved bills
of attainder based on the same charges contained in the articles of
impeachment and condemned the accused to death.224 Whatever Parliament
thought it was doing, it was not forswearing the power to punish, as treason,
conduct that had not expressly been held to be treasonous before.225
The general question of whether Parliament could impeach an official
for treason based on conduct not unambiguously defined as treason, by either
statute or existing precedent, has been the subject of dense scholarly debate.
Raoul Berger concluded in his influential Nixon-era book on impeachment
that Parliament had the power to declare what he called "retrospective
,,22627treasons. Historian Clayton Roberts, wrote a biting rebuttal.227  In
essence, he argued that while the Stuart-era House of Commons voted
articles of impeachment alleging innovative theories of treason-what he
calls "declarative treasons"-for Strafford, Laud, and other officials, these
impeachments rarely went to trial in the House of Lords, and never resulted
in convictions. Roberts concluded that the Lords were consciously resisting
the claim that they had the power to define and punish declaratory treason. 28
Roberts' argument from parliamentary practice has some force. He
cleverly characterizes Berger's emphasis on the treason charges brought by
the Commons, rather than the inaction of the Lords on those charges, as an
argument for the prosecution's view of law as opposed to the view of those
who sit as judges.229 But he falls victim in some degree to the reverse fallacy
by relying heavily on contemporaneous arguments from defenders of the
impeached officials for explanations of why impeachments did not achieve
conviction in the Lords. Moreover, he tends to gloss over the fact that in
multiple cases the Lords failed to convict, not because of any principled legal
judgment about the nature of treason, but due to events such as the king's
224. See supra notes 157-78, and accompanying text.
225. See BERGER, supra note 10, at 35-52.
226. BERGER, supra note 10, at 7-52.
227. Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger,
84 YALE L.J. 1419, 1427 (1975).
228. Id. at 1423-27.
229. Id. at 1426.
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dissolution of Parliament (Danby) or the accused's flight from the country
(Clarendon). In any event, his insistence that the judgment of the House of
Commons on what constitutes an impeachable treason is of no legal weight
pushes too far the analogy of parliamentary impeachment to an ordinary
criminal trial. In an English impeachment, the actions of both the Commons
and the Lords (like those of the American House and Senate) are moved by
complex judgments on law, fact, and politics. In England, just as in the
United States, the decisions of both the lower and upper house create
precedent. The fact is that throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, the Commons repeatedly impeached ministers, judges, and
officials for "declaratory" or "retrospective" treason and thereby secured its
objective of politically neutering those impeached, whether by
transformation of the impeachment to an attainder, an order of banishment,
or the defendant's flight from the jurisdiction. One may disapprove of
Parliament's persistent practice of loosely defining treason to achieve
political ends, but it is idle to deny that this was their practice.2 31
The potentially grisly result of an English treason conviction had
considerable influence on the Framers of the American constitution. The
Framers quite consciously removed the tension between the political
necessity of a non-electoral mechanism for removing erring officials and the
criminal theory rule against retrospective personal punishment by barring
230. Roberts' argument about treason seems misconceived on one other point. He contends
that the House of Lords acted as judges and was empowered to find treason only by reference to
pre-existing statutes or common law precedents, but he seems to misconceive the nature of common
law judging. Even in the modem United States where courts have expressly disavowed the power
to create new common law crimes, the power to interpret statutes, regulations, and the constitution
itself is de facto the power to make new law. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (finding in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a previously unknown
prohibition against racially segregated education facilities in the United States).
In the England of the Stuart period, this was even more the case because the "common law" was
judge-made law-an evolving set of principles and particular rules created by judges ruling by
analogy to prior decisions. To say that the Lords could not declare new treasons because they had
only the power of common law judges is a contradiction in terms. Common law judges created
"new" crimes all the time (even if they did not give their creations new names) by beginning with
old principles and precedents and using logic or the exigencies of changed circumstances to expand
the law.
231. The great British judge Sir Matthew Hale in his monumental work, History of the Pleas
of the Crown, was extremely critical of what he called "constructive treasons," decrying the danger
of departing from the precise terms of treason statutes "to multiply and inhanfe crimes into treafon
by ambiguous and general words, as accroaching of royal power, _fubverting of fundamental laws,
and the like." 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONIE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 86 (1736) [hereinafter HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN]. However, the point of his
criticism was to express disapproval of Parliamentary practice, not to deny its existence. Indeed,
he seems to grudgingly admit the power of Parliament to adjudge new treasons in particular cases,
while resisting the inference that such judgments create precedent for future cases outside of the
parliamentary setting. Id. at 262-64.
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bills of attainder 232 and limiting the consequence of a successful
impeachment to removal from office, leaving personal punishment to the
criminal courts.233  In the American setting, the fierce debates over
Parliament's power to declare retrospective treasons lose their point, leaving
only the question of the kinds of behavior that demand removal from office
for the good of the nation. Moreover, in the four centuries from 1376 to
1787, a great many British officials were impeached for offenses other than
treason.234 The most obvious lesson of these cases is that Parliament
routinely impeached, and often convicted people, for conduct that was
neither an indictable crime nor a plain violation of any existing law. We
have already discussed the Duke of Buckingham, impeached in 1626, for,
among other things, holding a plurality of offices, mismanaging his office as
Lord Admiral, and loaning English ships to the French king to use against
Protestant Huguenots ;235 the Earl of Strafford, impeached in 1715, for giving
"pernicious" advice to the crown to enter into the Treaty of Utrecht in the
War of the Spanish Succession; 236 as well as Warren Hastings, impeached
for conduct that even his chief accuser conceded were not crimes.237
Other examples include:
In 1642, Commons impeached Sir Richard Gurney, Lord Mayor of
London, principally it appears because Gurney made certain proclamations
in support of Charles I, attempted to suppress a petition of grievances
directed to Parliament, supported another petition critical of Parliament,238
and failed to transfer certain munitions to a storehouse in London contrary
to the orders of Parliament. On the strength of these allegations, Gurney was
charged with, among other things striving to "bring in an arbitrary and
tyrannical government. '239 He was convicted, stripped of the mayoralty,
disqualified from further office, and cast into prison. 240
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
233. 1d. at § 3, cl. 7.
234. See supra Parts III & IV.
235. See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
236. As noted above, supra note 158 and accompanying text, Strafford was impeached, along
with the Earl of Oxford and Viscount Bolingbroke, for essentially the same offenses, but Strafford's
charges were labeled high crimes and misdemeanors only, while Oxford and Bolingbroke were also
charged with treason. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 151462; BERGER, supra note 10, at 71-72.
237. See supra notes 159-180, and accompanying text.
238. HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 160-63. Several other men, including George
Benyon and Sir Edward Dering, were impeached around the same time for promoting a "false,
dangerous, and seditious petition" impugning Parliament. Id. at 141-43, 151-52.
239. Id. at 159-63.
240. Id. at 165-66. The articles contain no general descriptor of the charges. One source says
that the Speaker of the House of Commons informed Gurney that he was charged with "High
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Gurney's various pleadings in answer to the charges refer to them as
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In 1668, Peter Pett, a commoner in charge of the naval shipyard, was
impeached for allegedly failing to secure portions of the British fleet from
Dutch attack. 24 1
In 1701, the Earl of Orford, Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and William,
Earl of Portland were impeached for advising King William to enter into
treaties of which their parliamentary critics disapproved, as well as for
garden-variety corruption and, in the cases of Orford and Somers, playing a
role in the granting of letters of marque (a commission to act as a private
naval vessel) to William Kidd, who turned pirate as the infamous "Captain
Kidd." All were acquitted.
242
In 1710, an Anglican minister named Henry Sacheverell was
impeached and convicted for preaching a sermon at St. Paul's attacking
church dissenters and those in government disposed to tolerate them.243 He
was convicted, banned from preaching for three years, and his sermons were
ordered to be burned by the public hangman.244
B. The Meaning of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" in British
Practice
Careful perusal of four hundred years of British impeachments
convinces me that there was never any precise definition or even well-settled
understanding of what constituted impeachable conduct. With increasing
frequency beginning in the 1600s, Parliament employed the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors" at the beginning of articles of impeachment to
describe the list of offenses specified in the body of the document. But I find
no indication that this phrase, so critical to discussions of the impeachment
power under the U.S. constitution, was for the British ever a term of art in
the sense of necessarily including or excluding certain kinds of conduct. A
reasonable analogy in American practice is the common use of phrases like
"unlawfully and feloniously" at the beginning of each count of a criminal
indictment ("On or about January 1, 2019, the defendant, Sam Smith, did
"crimes and misdemeanors" or as "offences, practices, contempts, and misdemeanors." Id. at 163-
64.
241. HOWELL, VOL. VI, supra note 182, at 865-67. See also THE HISTORY OF PARLLAMENT:
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1660-1690 (B.D. Henning, ed., 2006), http://www.historyofparliamento
nline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/pett-peter- 1610-1672.
242. XIV T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 233-349 (1816). See generally Chester
Kirby, The Four Lords and the Partition Treaty, 52 AM. HIST. REv. 477 (1947). Whether Kidd
was really a pirate is disputed. See RICHARD ZACKS, THE PIRATE HUNTER: THE TRUE STORY OF
CAPTAIN KIDD (2003).
243. HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 1-35.
244. Id. at 29.
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unlawfully and feloniously" commit whatever crime he is being charged
with). This and similar phrases serve no practical function in American law.
They notify the defendant that the crime is a felony as opposed to a
misdemeanor, but even that is superfluous due to the invariable inclusion in
the indictment of a citation to the relevant statute. It is the statutory law that
makes conduct a felony, not the addition of the descriptor "feloniously" in
the indictment charging violation of a statute. Nonetheless, such phrases
persist because they are traditional and add a level of solemnity to the
accusation.
My sense is that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" served a
similar function in British impeachments. The words became traditional.
They emphasized the nature and gravity of the accusations in the articles of
impeachment. Putting it another way, "high crimes and misdemeanors" was
a phrase the drafters of British articles of impeachment habitually used to
preface their description of any conduct for which Parliament thought an
official should be impeached; it did not refer to a specified set of
impeachable offenses from which Parliament was obliged to choose if it
wanted to impeach an official. As heirs to the English common law tradition,
parliamentarians would have looked to prior impeachments as creating a
body of precedent from which they could infer some general principles about
the scope of properly impeachable conduct in future cases. But that is as
much as they or we could say.
C. The Scope of Impeachable Conduct in Great Britain
Parliament impeached people for a strikingly wide variety of official
misbehavior.245 It is possible to categorize the offenses charged under a
number of general headings and therefore to gain a fair appreciation of the
kinds of behavior Parliament thought to be impeachable:
1. Non-political Impeachments-Armed Rebellion and Ordinary
Criminality
A fair number of British impeachment proceedings resulted purely from
the ancient requirement that peers of the realm could be tried only by other
peers, that is by the House of Lords. Accordingly, if a hereditary peer was
accused either of armed rebellion against the crown 24 6 or an ordinary felony,
245. Parliament occasionally impeached private persons who held no official position. For
example, in 1698, John Goudet and nine other merchants were impeached for violating wartime
trade restrictions by doing business with France; most pled guilty and were fined. SIMPSON, supra
note 12, at 141-43. But consideration of those cases is omitted here as irrelevant to the influence
of British impeachment practice on the American institution of impeachment.
246. Levying war against the king in his realm was an undoubted capital treason. HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, supra note 231, at 130.
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the proceedings against him would often be framed either as an impeachment
or in some cases as an appeal directly to the House of Lords. Examples of
impeachments for armed rebellion include the seven Scottish lords
condemned for the 1715 Jacobite Rising 247 and the case of Lord Lovat
executed for his role in the 1745 rising.248 A classic example of impeachment
for ordinary criminality is the 1666 case against John Viscount Mordaunt for
unlawfully imprisoning William Tayleur, the surveyor of Windsor Castle,
and making "improper addresses" to Tayleur's daughter (a charge later
historians have interpreted as raping her).249
2. Corruption
The most common charge in British impeachments, even those in which
Parliament's primary concerns were political, was some variant of
corruption. From the first impeachments of Lord Latimer and Richard Lyons
in 1376250 right down to Hastings' case in 17875, corruption was an almost
invariable theme. 252 Even in the purely political cases, corruption allegations
were commonly included in the articles of impeachment.
The essence of all such corruption charges was the misuse of office for
private gain. Critically, a good many of the corruption charges were probably
not criminal in the technical sense. In pre-modern Britain, public service
was not compensated in the formal, regulated way we think of as customary.
In large part because the finances of the Crown were commonly so irregular
that budgeting for standardized salaries was impossible, officeholders were
rewarded with varying combinations of salaries, allowances, titles, grants of
land, rights to revenue, fees, monopolies, etc. Hence, distinguishing between
proper and improper money-making activities was sometimes difficult.
Nonetheless, the history of British impeachments illustrates that, even in a
247. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
249. John Mordaunt, 1st Viscount Mordaunt, 1626-75, BCW-PROJECT, http:/Ibcw-project.org
/biography/john-mordaunt (last visited July 19, 2018). Mordaunt was saved from judgment when
Charles II prorogued Parliament. HOWELL, VOL. VI, supra note 182, at 785-806.
250. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
252. In addition to those mentioned above, consider the cases of the Lord Treasurer Middlesex
(1624), HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1184; Sir William Penn (1668), HOWELL, VOL. VI,
supra note 182, at 869-78, SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 132; Edward Seymour, Treasurer of the
Navy, 8 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 127 (1816); and the Earl of Macclesfield
(1725), 16 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 767 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL.
XVI].
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system in which public office was expected to produce some private profit,
Parliament consistently viewed abuse of the system as impeachable. It was
understood that officeholders would make a competency, but violation of
formal rules and informal norms in pursuit of excessive self-enrichment was
not acceptable.
This idea became even more powerful in the comparatively straight-
laced American colonies where it would manifest itself in constitutional
provisions such as the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses.253 For the
Framers, the connection between the anti-corruption norm254 undergirding
these clauses and the remedy of impeachment was explicit. Bribery is
explicitly named as an impeachable offense, and at least one Framer declared
that violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause would be impeachable.2 55
3. Incompetence, Neglect of Duty, or Maladministration in Office
Another consistent theme of British impeachments was allegations of
incompetence, neglect of duty, or maladministration of office. Charges of
this sort often arose in connection with military disasters, including the
impeachments of Lord Latimer (1376), the Earl of Suffolk (1386), the Duke
of Buckingham (1626), the Earl of Strafford (1640), and Peter Pett (1668),
but they were hardly limited to that sphere. The charges against
Buckingham, Attorney General Henry Yelverton,256 the Lord Treasurer
Middlesex (1624), the Earl of Clarendon (1667), Lord Danby (1678),
Edward Seymour, Treasurer of the Navy (1680) ,257 and of course Warren
Hastings (1787) were all grounded in part on maladministration, neglect, or
sheer ineptitude. And several impeachments were grounded on ministers
giving the sovereign bad advice.258  The British routinely included
allegations of this sort under the descriptive heading "high crimes and
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, para. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 6 (prohibiting the President from receiving
any "Emolument" from the federal government or the states beyond "a Compensation" for his
"Services" as chief executive).
254. On the anti-corruption norm in the U.S. Constitution, see generally Zephyr Teachout, The
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
255. Edmund Randolph was a delegate to both the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
and the Virginia ratification convention. During the Virginia convention, he observed, "There is
another provision against the danger, mentioned by the honorable member, of the President
receiving emoluments from foreign powers. If discovered, he may be impeached." 3 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 326 (1827).
256. HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 87, at 1136.
257. HOWELL, VOL. VIII, supra note 209, at 127.
258. See e.g., supra note 238, and accompanying text.
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misdemeanors." The question of how to harmonize this British precedent
with the Framers' abandonment of "maladministration" as a ground for
impeachment in favor of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is beyond the
scope of the present Article. For present purposes, it is enough to say that,
in light of British precedent, the effect of George Mason's exchange of the
two terms is less obvious than it seems.
4. Abuse of Power
Most British impeachments involved some form of abuse of official
power. Most of these can be placed in one of the preceding two categories-
corruption or maladministration-insofar as the motive for the abuse was the
hope of preferment or monetary gain, or the abuse arose primarily due to
incompetence or neglect. Nonetheless, some cases involved abuses that
seem to have been moved by simple bloody-mindedness or the enjoyment of
exercising unchecked power. Some of the charges in Hastings' case fall in
this category. Even more apt are the charge against Viscount Mordaunt for
falsely imprisoning the surveyor of Windsor Castle 259 and a case not
previously mentioned, the impeachment of Chief Justice Scroggs for, among
other things, "browbeating" witnesses and disparaging them to the jury.2 60
5. Betrayal of the Nation's Foreign Policy
Another persistent thread in British impeachments is the charge that the
impeached minister had pursued a policy at odds with the nation's basic
foreign policy interests. Impeachments on this ground were a constant of
parliamentary practice beginning with the charges against William de la Pole
in 1450 for his role in arranging the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of
Anjou 261 through the 1701 impeachments of the four lords (Orford, Somers,
Halifax, and Portland) in connection with the Treaty of Partition 262 and the
1715 impeachments of Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Strafford for their
advocacy of the Treaty of Utrecht,26 3 and including the 1787 impeachment
of Warren Hastings over fundamental disagreements about the proper
259. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
260. BERGER, supra note 10, at 249.
261. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 194
262. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. Other cases include the impeachments of the
Earl of Middlesex (1624), the Duke of Buckingham, charged with helping the Catholic French king
against the Protestant French Huguenots (1626), the Earl of Danby, impeached for his role in
negotiating British neutrality in the Franco-Dutch War (1678). See supra notes 183-86 and
accompanying text.
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relationship of Great Britain to its Indian possessions and the states that
abutted them.
264
Impeachments for betrayal of the country's foreign policy objectives
have received relatively little notice among American impeachment
scholars, presumably because the only arguably similar American case was
the first impeachment of Senator William Blount charged in 1797 with
conspiring to assist the British in acquiring Spanish territory in Florida.265
However, this line of British precedent deserves renewed attention. Over
and over again, Parliament employed impeachment to assert an authority
independent of the royal executive to define the nation's true foreign policy
interests.
The analogy to the current president's disparagement or outright
abandonment of long-established defense and trade relationships with
democratic states in Europe, the Americas, and Asia in favor of
mercantilism, "America First" isolationism, and a growing affinity for
authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Hungary, Turkey, and the
Philippines is obvious. It can fairly be argued that, particularly when
considered in the aggregate, this conduct is far more destructive of American
interests than Senator Blount's failed Florida adventure or any of the policies
for which Parliament routinely impeached royal ministers. More
importantly, the active tilt away from the democratic West in favor of
affiliation with authoritarians is not the manifestation of a considered policy
difference between the political parties or of a significant body of opinion
within the military and security establishment. It is, rather, a purely personal
tendency suggestive of an affinity for domestic authoritarianism and thus
shades into the next accepted ground for parliamentary impeachment.
6. Subversion of the Constitution and Laws of the Realm
From the first impeachments in 1376, through the tumults of the Stuart
period, and right up to the case of Warren Hastings in 1787, Parliament
employed impeachment against ministers and officials whose actions
threatened its understanding of proper constitutional order. More
particularly, Parliament acted repeatedly against those who sought to enlarge
or misuse executive/monarchical power at the expense of those elements of
society whose interests were represented in Parliament, or contrary to the
legal order established by statutes and the common law courts. The
impeachments of Francis Bacon in 1621, the Duke of Buckingham in 1626,
the Earl of Strafford and Archbishop Laud in 1640, the Earl of Clarendon in
264. See supra notes 196-218, and accompanying text.
265. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, GLASS HOUSES, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS AND
THE POLITICS OF VENOM 21 (2018).
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1667, and the Earl of Danby in 1678 are the most notable examples of this
category of impeachments. In the cases of Strafford, Laud, Clarendon, and
Danby, Parliament explicitly alleged some variant of the charge against
Danby that he "endeavored to subvert the ancient and well established form
of government in this kingdom, and instead thereof to introduce and arbitrary
and tyrannical way of government. 26 6  And as noted above, the
impeachment of Warren Hastings was an effort to extend the traditional
constitutional relationships between rulers and ruled in the home islands to
the structure of the growing British Empire.
267
This use of impeachment is of paramount interest in the current moment
of American history. It establishes that, at least in British practice, the most
important function of impeachment was removal or exemplary chastisement
of officials whose behavior presented a threat to constitutional order. In such
cases, impeachment need not have been based on discrete incidents of
violation of specified laws. Rather, the essence of such cases was a
continuing pattern of conduct in opposition to Parliament's conception of
proper constitutional arrangements. To employ modern terminology, these
impeachments were consciously undertaken either to restore or establish
constitutional norms. I will leave to the reader contemplation of whether
reinvigoration of this conception of impeachment is timely.
Conclusion
In the end, impeachment is political, in both the small and large senses.
That is, even when impeachment is sought to effect large constitutional ends,
it will not occur unless the small politics of personal and party advantage
produce the necessary votes. In that regard, then-Congressman Gerald Ford
was right when he famously declared that, in the United States, an
impeachable offense "is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers [it] to be at a given moment in history., 268 Nonetheless, as I
concluded some twenty years ago when writing about the Clinton
impeachment, arguments about constitutional language and its antecedents
matter because they have the effect of setting rough boundaries on the field
on which the political battle is fought.269 If an impeachment battle is to be
fought again soon, perhaps this discussion of the British antecedents of
American impeachment will assist in setting those boundaries.
266. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 198-221 and accompanying text.
268. 116 Cong. Rec. H3313-14 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford).
269. Bowman, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, supra note 10, at 1564.
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